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ABSTRACT 
Recent technological advancements have challenged financial markets. Academic 
researchers, regulators and market participants voice concerns that modern markets bear the 
negative externalities of such advancements. Specifically, they are concerned that today’s 
markets are becoming more fragile and unfair to less sophisticated traders. This work 
employs empirical methodology to test whether these concerns are justified. This thesis 
contains three essays: 
The first essay studies whether modern markets become less liquid during intraday 
extreme price movements (EPMs). When a price moves in a certain direction, liquidity 
providers face two opposing incentives. The first incentive is to stay in the market to 
accumulate more inventory in anticipation of a price reversal. The second incentive is to 
withdraw due to capital constraints, inventory and adverse selection risks. Using data from 
Canadian and U.S. markets, I find that the former incentive is stronger during intraday EPMs. 
This finding alleviates concerns that prices are subject to periods of extreme volatility due to 
systematic liquidity withdrawals. Contrary to these concerns, liquidity providers appear 
sufficiently incentivized to dampen intraday volatility. 
The second essay examines the activity of a specific type of modern liquidity providers 
– high frequency traders (HFTs) – around EPMs. I find that, on average, HFTs provide 
liquidity during EPMs by absorbing imbalances created by non-high frequency traders 
(nHFTs). Yet HFT liquidity provision is limited to EPMs in single stocks. When several 
stocks experience simultaneous EPMs, HFT liquidity demand dominates their supply. There 
is little evidence of HFTs causing EPMs. 
The third essay studies whether recent technological advancements result in higher 
costs for less sophisticated traders. In modern markets, trading firms spend generously to gain 
a speed advantage over their rivals. The marketplace that results from this rivalry is 
characterized by speed differentials whereby some traders are faster than others. Is such a 
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marketplace optimal? To answer this question, I study a series of exogenous weather-related 
episodes that temporarily remove the speed advantages of the fastest traders by disrupting 
their microwave networks. During these episodes, adverse selection declines accompanied by 
improved liquidity and reduced volatility. Liquidity improvement is larger than the decline in 
adverse selection consistent with the emergence of latent liquidity and enhanced competition 
among liquidity suppliers. The results are confirmed in an event-study setting, whereby a new 
business model adopted by one of the technology providers reduces speed differentials 
among traders, which results in liquidity improvements. 
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Chapter 1. DOES LIQUIDITY EVAPORATE? INTRADAY EVIDENCE 
1.1. Introduction 
Modern markets are often claimed to bear alarming levels of short-term and long-term 
volatility. Violent price movements pose especially high concern when they are not related to 
changes in fundamentals. According to Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) and Khan, Kogan and 
Serafeim (2012), uninformed liquidity demand can lead to non-fundamental price pressures that 
persist for a considerable time. Such price pressures can be observed not only in the long run. 
When liquidity demand is not absorbed by liquidity supply within a short time interval, it has the 
potential to trigger intraday price movements of large magnitude. Easley, López de Prado and 
O’Hara (2011, 2012) and Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2016) show that, during one such 
price pressure episode – the flash crash of May 6, 2010 – electronic liquidity providers reduced 
their activity. The joint agency report
1
 on the October 15, 2014 U.S. Treasury Flash Crash also 
discusses a reduction in liquidity supply. Echoing an industry-wide concern, CFTC chair 
Timothy Massad recently noted that, during large intraday price movements, liquidity providers 
tend to cancel standing orders at the top of the book and then place the orders at deeper book 
layers.
2
 Because of this behavior, liquidity tends to evaporate when it is most needed. 
This concern often finds support in academic studies on evaporating liquidity. According 
to these studies, when prices are under pressure, market makers reposition liquidity to deeper 
layers of the book, as they look to benefit from the reversals that follow (e.g., Nagel, 2012; 
Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014; So and Wang, 2014). Due to such repositioning, liquidity 
demanders quickly consume thin layers of the book, leading to price overshooting and 
subsequent reversals.  
                                                          
1
 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_10-15-2015.pdf 
2
 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-30 
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 The literature on contrarian trading suggests, however, that large price movements should 
be associated with improved liquidity supply. Instead of repositioning the limit orders to the 
deeper layers of the book, liquidity providers should quote more aggressively, because on 
average large price movements are likely to be driven by uninformed order flow leading to large 
reversals (Lehmann, 1990; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Avramov, 
Chordia and Goyal, 2006). According to this view, liquidity demanders should find sufficient 
liquidity supply throughout the book during price pressure episodes.  
This paper tests whether limit order book depth and the price impacts of marketable orders 
point to the dominance of evaporating liquidity or competitive contrarian liquidity provision 
during intraday price movements. I design tests assuming the following model of liquidity 
provision: First, competitive liquidity providers choose how much depth to place at every level 
of the limit order book. Second, liquidity demanders begin submitting marketable orders that 
consume some of the depth thus moving the price. Third, liquidity providers choose to either 
keep the remaining limit orders or cancel them. If they cancel, liquidity evaporates as in Nagel 
(2012), and prices overshoot. Finally, prices reverse once liquidity demand has been exhausted 
and the book bounces back. 
My findings suggest that for intraday price pressures evaporating liquidity does not 
dominate modern markets. On average, the per share impact of marketable orders decreases and 
the limit order book depth increases in the magnitude of price movements. 
Although the data generally suggest that liquidity does not evaporate, I find some evidence 
for the existence of market making strategies suggested by Nagel (2012), Hendershott and 
Menkveld (2014) and So and Wang (2014). Specifically, I observe that limit order book depth is 
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net cancelled in the way of price movements and repositioned deeper in the book. The economic 
effect of this repositioning is however small and affects less than 6% of total depth. 
The literature on evaporating liquidity suggests that short-term price inefficiencies serve as 
a profit source for market makers. To support the existence of the contrarian trading incentive, I 
show that the profitability of limit order trading increases in the magnitude of intraday price 
inefficiencies. The aggregate profits from liquidity provision increase by $9-92 per price 
movement with one standard deviation increase in the transitory component of price volatility. 
This confirms that liquidity providers are willing to increase contrarian limit order placement 
when the expected transitory price component is large. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 describes how the paper fits into the 
extant literature, Section 1.3 describes the data and methodology, Section 1.4 reports summary 
statistics, Section 1.5 contains empirical findings on limit order book dynamics and contrarian 
profits, and Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
 1.2. Literature review 
The paper builds on three strands of literature. The first strand emphasizes the risks and 
constraints of liquidity provision, which implies that market makers should withdraw during 
price pressures. The second strand of literature discusses the profitability of contrarian strategies, 
which implies that contrarian traders should accumulate inventory against the direction of price 
pressures. The third strand combines the first two by suggesting that the size and frequency of 
price reversals are increasing when market makers scale back to earn higher compensation for 
the risks of liquidity provision through contrarian profits. The goal of this paper is to test whether 
4 
 
large intraday price pressures create significant risks so that liquidity providers will supply less 
liquidity consistent with the behaviour suggested by the third strand. 
The size of inventory that liquidity providers are willing to accumulate depends on 
multiple incentives and constraints. In the theory literature, severe instances of mispricing, such 
as stock market bubbles (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and downward liquidity spirals 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Huang and Wang, 2009), are often attributed to the lack of 
funding liquidity available to contrarian traders. Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) support the 
abovementioned theoretical predictions by showing that NYSE market makers provide less 
liquidity when their balance sheet revenues decrease. Furthermore, the significant co-movement 
of stocks can drain the capital of liquidity providers and lead to illiquidity and large price 
reversals (Andrade, Chang and Seasholes, 2008; Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan, 2010; 
Hameed and Mian, 2015). 
Market makers may choose to limit their inventory exposure even if capital constraints are 
not binding. For example, it is in a liquidity provider’s interest to withdraw quotes in anticipation 
of incoming informed market orders. Bonart and Gould (2015) show that limit order traders 
successfully adjust their strategies to market order arrivals. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld 
(2011) observe that, with the proliferation of algorithmic liquidity provision, quote cancellation 
and repositioning account for a higher proportion of price discovery than trades. Liquidity 
shortages due to increased anticipated informed trading may occasionally cause excessive price 
fluctuations (Easley, Lopez de Prado and O’Hara, 2011, 2012). Panayides (2007) shows that 
liquidity can be temporarily improved by affirmative obligations forcing market makers to 
accumulate informed order flow. When the obligations are not binding, liquidity deteriorates 
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because market makers have to compensate for the position losses incurred during mandatory 
participation. 
Finally, liquidity providers may fail to accommodate order flow if it creates significant 
dislocations in their preferred holding portfolios (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980). Large order 
flows may impede portfolio diversification and set the liquidity provider’s inventory risk above 
the acceptable level. According to Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), NYSE specialists maintain 
target inventory levels by selectively withdrawing from liquidity provision on either the buy or 
the sell side of the bid ask spread. Malinova and Park (2016) show that modern low-latency 
market makers continue to manage their inventory through quote withdrawal, which leads to 
lower liquidity and higher volatility. Market makers may be especially unwilling to hold highly 
risky portfolios because the stochastic nature of liquidity demand makes the portfolio holding 
period uncertain (Ho and Stoll, 1981). This effect may further aggravate the depletion of the 
limit order book during price pressures. 
However, price pressures incentivise liquidity providers and arbitrageurs to increase 
liquidity supply in anticipation of higher contrarian profits. Due to the execution uncertainty of 
non-marketable limit orders, liquidity providers are often assumed to be less informed than 
traders who require immediacy. Although liquidity providers may not know if a specific price 
pressure will result in a permanent or a transitory price dislocation, they may observe that most 
price movements revert over time and engage in contrarian trading (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; 
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal, 2006; Hendershott and Seasholes, 2007; Biais, Declerck and 
Moinas, 2016). According to Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), the expected 
reversible price component increases in the magnitude of the price movements. This finding 
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implies that large price movements should lead to high expected profits from contrarian trading 
and create strong incentives for contrarian liquidity provision. 
The literature suggesting that liquidity providers should withdraw during large price 
movements and the literature on the profitability of contrarian trading are generalized by papers 
proposing the risk-return trade-off of contrarian liquidity provision. The trade-off between the 
risks and contrarian profits of market making in volatile markets has been studied by Nagel 
(2012). He estimates that contrarian trading becomes more profitable during volatile daily and 
multiple-day intervals. He suggests that, when uncertainty is high, liquidity providers scale back 
and extract additional contrarian profits to compensate for risks and constraints. This leads to the 
evaporating liquidity effect when uninformed order flow creates large price movements that 
reverse over time. 
So and Wang (2014) show that, consistent with Nagel (2012), price reversals become more 
prevalent and contrarian trading strategies become more profitable during intervals of high 
uncertainty around earnings announcements. Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) develop a model 
predicting that the daily reversible price component may become larger when risk-averse market 
makers rebalance their inventory. Following Weill (2007), constrained market makers may 
refrain from liquidity provision at certain points during price reversals, which will lead to jumps 
and aggravate the magnitude of these reversals. As such, the literature on evaporating liquidity 
suggests that the market is often in equilibrium where market makers have incentives to 
withdraw from liquidity provision with the purpose of benefiting from resulting price reversals. 
A burgeoning literature on algorithmic and high-frequency trading takes the debate on 
whether the risk-return trade-off of liquidity provision results in an equilibrium with evaporating 
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liquidity to the intraday level. This literature divides microstructure researchers into two 
opposing camps. 
On the one hand, several papers find that algorithmic liquidity providers may mitigate 
intraday volatility spikes while making contrarian profits (Anand and Venkataraman, 2016; 
Subrahmanyam and Zheng, 2015; Brogaard et al., 2016). The mechanism for such mitigation has 
been discussed by Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001), who find that liquidity providers step in after 
periods of high intraday volatility and mitigate the magnitude of price movements. The finding 
that intraday algorithmic traders act as contrarians during intraday price movements is supported 
by the literature suggesting that algorithmic trading leads to more efficient intraday prices 
(Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld, 2011; Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Conrad, 
Wahal and Xiang, 2015). Colliard (2015) shows that, although contrarian traders and market 
makers counteract short-term price reversals and make prices more efficient in the short run, they 
may impede price discovery in the long run. This camp, as a whole, suggests that the 
technological advancement of liquidity provision pushes markets to the equilibrium where 
intraday price movements are dominated by competitive contrarian liquidity provision.  
On the other hand, some studies show that algorithmic traders have incentive to reposition 
liquidity to the deeper layers of the limit order book and increase the magnitude of intraday price 
movements (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun, 2016; van Kervel, 2015). The finding that 
algorithmic traders have the potential to exacerbate price fluctuations is consistent with the 
results of Korajczyk and Murphy (2015) and Menkveld and van Kervel (2015) who show that 
high frequency traders switch from liquidity supply to liquidity demand during the execution of 
large institutional trades. As a whole, this camp as a whole suggests that the technological 
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advancement of liquidity provision pushes markets to the equilibrium where intraday price 
movements are dominated by evaporating liquidity. 
This paper takes one step further and tests whether intraday price movements in the 
modern Canadian and US equity markets are in equilibrium dominated by competitive contrarian 
liquidity provision or evaporating liquidity. Although the paper does not attempt to identify the 
impact of algorithmic and high-frequency trading activity per se, it provides empirical evidence 
that is generally consistent with the former equilibrium.  
 
1.3. Data and methodology 
The main results are obtained from two datasets. The first is order data from the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) for the full year of 2006, and the second is millisecond trade and quote 
DTAQ data for the full year of 2014. The TSX dataset is the same as that used by Anand and 
Venkataraman (2016). Reliable estimation of the reversible price component requires a sufficient 
number of observations, which are often not available in small stocks. To ensure reliability, I use 
the TSX60 index constituents, which are the most active stocks in the Canadian market.  
Although the Canadian market circa 2006 lacks some features of today’s markets, such as 
the dominance of high frequency trader (HFT) algorithms and the proliferation of dark pools, the 
TSX data have two advantages. First, the data contain all limit order placements and 
cancellations: thus, allowing an examination of the limit order book beyond the best quotes. 
Second, the TSX data allows exact identification regarding whether a particular trade was 
triggered by marketable ask or bid order while the trade direction is not identified in the DTAQ 
data. I use Lee and Ready (1991) trade classification algorithm to identify trade direction in the 
DTAQ sample. 
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To address the possibility that the 2006 sample is not representative of modern markets, I 
test my findings on a 2014 sample of U.S. stocks from the DTAQ database. Although the DTAQ 
data do not report orders, they are available for a recent time period when high frequency trading 
accounts for a substantial share of the trading volume. Moreover, the data allow me to confirm 
that the results are not unique to the Canadian market. Unlike the Canadian market circa 2006, 
trading activity in the modern U.S. market is significant outside of the major indices, allowing 
for proper estimation of a reversible price component for smaller stocks. A broad sample of 
stocks with different capitalizations will allow me to observe possible differences in limit order 
book depth dynamics around price reversals. I construct the sample of US stocks using a 
procedure similar to Chakrabarty, Jain, Shkilko and Sokolov (2016). This procedure involves 
two steps: First, I assign market capitalization and trading volume rank to all stocks in the CRSP 
database, and second, I select three groups of thirty stocks each as large, medium and small 
based on the sum of the market capitalization and trading volume ranks.  
The sample is constructed in tick time, where tick is an update of the midquote price. 
Calendar time sampling would lead to an incomparable number of intervals with zero activity 
across different samples. Another alternative could be trade time sampling. Trade time sampling 
does not have the shortcomings of calendar time sampling but, as shown by Aït-Sahalia, 
Mykland and Zhang (2011), leads to the overestimation of the reversible price component due to 
bid-ask bounce. As such, tick time sampling does not have either of the above shortcomings and 
appears to be the best alternative for the purpose of current analysis. 
The primary set of results is focused on the dynamics of depth and expected reversible 
price component over the series of consecutive same-directional midquote updates forming the 
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price movements. All price movements during the trading day are included in the sample. The 
typical price movement can be presented as follows: 
Return sign                     … 
Number of quote updates 
before pivot  
4 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1  
Pivot point no no no yes no no yes no no yes 
 
 
I estimate the expected reversible price component as the signed difference between the 
current pivot price
3
 and forecasted pivot price at t+1. Price forecast could be obtained using an 
autoregressive model similar to the one used in Hasbrouck (1993). Although I confirm my 
findings with Hasbrouck methodology on a daily level, I choose a simplified approach for 
intraday estimation of the expected reversible price component.  
The intraday reversible price components are estimated using the following steps: First, I 
rank all pivot-to-pivot log returns for the same stock into twenty buckets by magnitude. Then I 
run the following AR(1) model for each stock: 
                     
where      and        are the current and lagged midquote returns for the stock  .  
The coefficients are used to obtain the expected future return estimate  ̂ . This estimate is 
the reversible price component at time    . For each interval, it shows the percentage of price 
that is expected to be corrected in the future conditioned on past return. This variable can be 
compared to the return at time     in sign and magnitude. Conditional on execution at the pivot 
points, the expected compensation for contrarian liquidity providers will be a sum of effective 
spread and reversible price component. 
                                                          
3
 Since most of the returns within the sequence of midquote-to-midquote updates have a magnitude bounded by the 
minimum tick size, it is more appropriate to estimate the reversible component of the total pivot-to-pivot return. The 
results, however, are robust to estimation with midquote-to-midquote returns and are available upon request.  
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 1.4. Summary statistics  
To capture the differences in liquidity provision during price movements of different 
magnitude, I split the sample into two subsamples. The first one includes only price movements 
with the magnitude below the 90
th
 percentile while the second one includes the price movements 
with the magnitude above 90
th
 percentile. Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics. The average 
time between the two midquote updates ranges between 3 and 10 seconds for non-extreme price 
movements (non-EPMs) and between 22 and 33 seconds for extreme price movements (EPMs). 
Since modern quote-to-trade ratios tend to be high, the majority of non-EPM price movements 
happen without trading, with the median number of shares traded per price movement being as 
low as zero. This, however, does not imply that volume is trivial when trading takes place. Even 
for a subsample of non-EPMs, several hundreds of shares are demanded on average in the 
direction of return. The EPM sample contains intervals with much more intense trading activity 
ranging from a few thousand to more than ten thousand shares traded during the average EPM. 
When more shares are demanded on one side of the quotes than on the other, volume 
imbalance is created. Consistent with the literature on market making inventory management, 
prices yield to such volume imbalances. The ratio of shares demanded in the direction of return 
to those demanded against the direction of the return is about two. 
This volume imbalance ratio is consistent across the TSX and US samples. Unlike the TSX 
data, the data on US markets does not report whether each particular trade is initiated by buy or 
sell marketable order, and I use Lee and Ready (1991) trade classification algorithm to identify 
trade direction in the US data. The consistency of the volume imbalance ratio for both the TSX 
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and the US samples suggests that Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm provides a reasonable 
estimation of trade direction. 
Despite the differences in sample periods, the TSX sample is comparable to the US 
sample. Trading activity in TSX stocks most closely resembles trading activity in US medium-
sized stocks. Nonetheless, consistent with lower levels of algorithmic and high-frequency trading 
activity, price movements last longer in the TSX sample.  
In modern markets, liquidity is provided by a variety of market participants. Among them, 
high-frequency traders have the technological capacity to react to order flow exceptionally 
quickly. Therefore, they can withdraw limit orders with ease as EPMs develop. I note that high-
frequency traders are present only in the US sample. 
The behavior of liquidity demanders during negative price movements may be affected by 
short-selling restrictions. The TSX sample may therefore contain price declines of smaller 
magnitude. This said, the restrictions are unlikely to affect the US sample because they are 
triggered only after a 10% price decline. It is also possible that the magnitude of price 
movements is reduced by the routing software. Since order routers observe the state of the book 
in real time, they may opt out of demanding too much if the book is thin thereby mitigating the 
price movements. 
 
 1.5. Results 
1.5.1. The dominance of the contrarian trading incentive 
The success of contrarian trading implies that the magnitude of the pricing error is 
positively related to the probability of a price reversal. If it were not the case, then pricing errors 
would systematically increase over time, leading to losses for contrarian traders, and eventually 
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to market crashes. Pricing errors cannot be observed, which makes studies that use various 
techniques for pricing error estimation subject to criticism that the results depend on the choice 
of these techniques. However, price movements are observed, and according to Lehmann (1990) 
and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), larger price movements should contain a larger reversible 
component. 
I use probit analysis to test if the relation between the probability of a reversal and the 
magnitude of the pricing error proxied by the return magnitude is consistent with the profitability 
of contrarian trading. Specifically, I estimate the probability that the current midquote update is a 
pivot point conditional on accumulated return. According to the coefficients reported in the 
Table 1.2, the return magnitude is positively related to the probability of reversal. The result is 
consistent across all samples. On average, the probability of a price reversal increases by 14% 
with one basis point increase in cumulative EPM return for the most active stocks. Pricing errors 
do not systematically accumulate over time. This shows that contrarian traders have a stronger 
incentive to trade against the direction of return when the pricing error increases.  
Contrarian trading incentive defines the shape of the limit order book before a price 
movement begins. Specifically, deeper layers of the book typically contain more shares. As such, 
available contrarian depth should increase as market orders consume first layers of the book 
unless substantial amount of depth is cancelled.  
I estimate contrarian depth as a share depth of the best bid (ask) quote for intervals with a 
negative (positive) midquote return weighted by the proportion of time the quote depth remained 
unchanged in the entire duration of the price movement. This variable represents instant liquidity 
that limit order traders are willing to provide at the best contrarian quote. Figure 1.1 plots 
contrarian depth and the reversible price component by return magnitude percentiles. According 
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to the figure, consistent with the dominance of contrarian trading incentive, contrarian limit order 
depth increases with an increase in return magnitude and the reversible price component. 
The depth of the best contrarian quotes suggests that intraday price movements do not 
typically accelerate because of a lack of contrarian liquidity provision. Notably, however, not all 
of the limit orders placed at the best quotes end up being executed. Some limit orders can be 
cancelled and repositioned, as the literature on constrained liquidity provision suggests. For 
example, according to van Kervel (2015), observed limit order book depth can be misleading as 
some liquidity providers may cancel limit orders when they observe substantial liquidity 
demand. To address this possibility, I construct additional measures of the willingness of an 
average liquidity provider to accumulate inventory against the direction of the price movements. 
The first measure is the elasticity of the best contrarian quotes. For a positive (negative) 
price movement, it captures the number of shares that liquidity providers supply to marketable 
buy (sell) orders per one-cent update of the best ask (bid) quote: 
           
         
                    
 
Although I focus on the elasticity of the contrarian quote in testing whether contrarian 
trading incentive dominates the incentive to reposition liquidity, I provide estimates of non-
contrarian elasticity, which is computed in a similar manner: 
              
           
                       
 
The second measure takes into account that marketable orders traded against the direction 
of price movements can decrease the inventory risks of liquidity providers. It is computed as the 
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inverse
4
 of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, except that the data allows me to use the net 
volume traded in the direction of return instead of the total volume: 
          
                     
|   |
 
Table 1.3 reports statistics for EPMs and non-EPMs. Consistent with the literature on 
contrarian trading, an average EPM contains a reversible price component of a magnitude that is 
several times higher than that of an average non-EPM. In line with Figure 1.1, the best contrarian 
depth is 12-50% higher during EPMs. This suggests that net liquidity supply during an intraday 
price movement is dominated by incentives of contrarian trading rather than by risk aversion and 
capital constraints. Contrarian limit order book depth is significantly higher during EPMs.  
The estimates of the elasticity of contrarian quotes point to the same direction as the 
estimates of the best limit order book depth. Specifically, in the TSX sample, the best contrarian 
quote yields by one cent after 826 shares are demanded during the EPM, while it yields to 
demand after 304 shares are demanded during non-EPMs. The result is consistent and 
statistically significant for all samples. Comparison of inverse Amihud measures for EPM and 
non-EPM intervals reveals that it takes a two times higher net volume imbalance to move the 
midquote price by one cent during EPMs than during non-EPMs. For example, in the TSX 
sample, it takes 913 shares of net volume to move the midquote by one cent during EPMs while 
it takes only 450 shares to achieve the same result during non-EPMs. The corresponding net 
volumes for the sample of the most active US stocks are 7,470 and 3,547 shares, respectively. 
The fact that both contrarian quote elasticity and inverse Amihud measure point to an 
increase in liquidity supply during EPMs suggests that evaporating liquidity is not a concern for 
an average intraday EPM. Even if some of the limit order book depth is repositioned from the 
                                                          
4
 By design, the sample does not contain zero-return intervals. This allows me to invert the original measure for 
more intuitive economic interpretation. 
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best quotes at the beginning of a price movement towards the end of a price movement, thus 
increasing its magnitude, the volume executed per one-cent price update ends up being higher 
during larger price movements than it is during smaller ones. 
 
1.5.2. Does liquidity evaporate at all on the intraday level?   
Contrarian incentive appears to be stronger than the incentive to scale back from liquidity 
provision on the intraday level. In this section, I use TSX data to examine if there is any evidence 
of evaporating liquidity. According to Nagel (2012), Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) and So 
and Wang (2014), liquidity providers have an incentive to reposition limit orders further from the 
best quotes so that larger pricing errors would compensate for risks and constraints. 
Figure 1.2 describes limit order book dynamics around the pivot points of intraday 
reversals. Intraday limit order book dynamics during price movements has three important 
features. First, the limit order book depth is net placed at the future best contrarian quote at the 
pivot point. Second, the depth is net cancelled at the limit order book layers between the current 
price and the future pivot point. Third, the amount of depth net cancelled is economically small 
for both EPMs and non-EPMs. 
The above observations suggest that the evaporating liquidity effect described by Nagel 
(2012), Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) and So and Wang (2014) for the daily and multiple-
day price reversals also exists for the intraday ones. That said, consistent with my earlier finding 
that the contrarian limit order book depth increases in the magnitude of the intraday price 
movements, the evaporating liquidity does not exacerbate the magnitude of these movements.
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Table 1.4 contains detailed analysis of the limit order book depth placement and 
cancellation dynamics during the five ticks before the pivot point.
5
 As the price moves in a 
certain direction, contrarian depth is withdrawn from the limit order book layers in the direction 
of the price updates and placed at the future best contrarian quote. For example, during non-
EPMs, one tick before the stock stops falling (raising) at the best contrarian quote            , 
there is, on average, 80 shares net cancelled at the quote above      (below     ) and 262 shares 
net placed at the quote            . One tick before the end of the EPMs, there is, on average, 53 
shares net cancelled in the way of the price movements and 83 shares placed at the future best 
pivot quotes. The number of shares cancelled represents 6.7% and 2.6% of the average best 
contrarian depth during non-EPMs and EPMs, respectively. As such, despite the existence of the 
evaporating liquidity effect during intraday price movements, this effect does not increase in the 
magnitude of price movements and has small economic significance. 
The contrarian depth placed at the layers that are less competitive than the future best pivot 
quote is not executed during the ongoing price movement. The decrease in contrarian depth 
placement at these layers suggests two non-exclusive explanations. First, the liquidity providers 
who engage in reversal trading strategies described by the literature on evaporating liquidity 
have a smaller incentive to assume inventory risk after a certain point. Second, such liquidity 
providers can successfully predict the pivot points of intraday EPMs and non-EPMs.  
The above results point to the existence of limit order repositioning on the intraday level 
that is consistent with the activity of liquidity providers described by Nagel (2012), Hendershott 
and Menkveld (2014) and So and Wang (2014) on the daily and multiple-day level. In line with 
the increasing information content of limit orders documented by Hendershott, Jones and 
                                                          
5
 Limit order book depth dynamics prior to the last five ticks before the pivot point continues the pattern observed 
during the last five ticks. The results are available upon request. 
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Menkveld (2011) and O’Hara (2015), the repositioned limit order book depth appears to be 
highly predictive of the price movement ending point. However, the economic effect of the 
repositioned liquidity is small, and it does not increase with the magnitude of price movements. 
 
1.5.3. Profitability of contrarian liquidity provision 
The positive relation between contrarian liquidity provision and return magnitude is 
consistent with liquidity providers extracting contrarian profits from price reversals, as suggested 
by Nagel (2012). However, an alternative explanation is especially pertinent to intraday price 
movements: the possibility that increased limit order book depth during large intraday price 
movements is due to limit orders being picked off by fast informed liquidity demanders rather 
than due to a significant pricing error component of the large price movements. If this is the case, 
then large intraday price movements and pricing errors would result in losses for aggregated 
limit order traders on average. 
Although the profitability of contrarian strategies and aggregated limit order trading has 
been documented by earlier studies, there is no empirical evidence for the relation between 
pricing errors and profits from liquidity provision. The goal of this section is to test whether 
aggregated profits of limit order trading are increasing consistent with contrarian trading 
incentive or decreasing consistent with informed liquidity demand by fast traders. 
I estimate aggregate profits from a limit order strategy using a methodology developed by 
Handa and Schwartz (1996). This methodology allows estimating the total daily profit from 
liquidity provision as a sum of two components: 
                       ̅                 
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where    and    are the average prices per share executed through non-marketable sell and buy 
limit orders,    and    are the numbers of shares traded against ask and bid quotes,      is the 
end-of-day midquote,
6
  ̅     if       and  ̅     if      .  
The first term corresponds to the aggregate realized profit from spread and reversals, and 
the second term corresponds to the unrealized profit from the end-of-day position. To make the 
data comparable across stock-days with different numbers of reversals, I scale the profits by the 
number of pivot points per day. Gross profit estimates are not affected by possible make-or-take 
fee structure discrepancies. Since liquidity provision rebates are independent of the positioning 
of non-marketable limit orders in the limit order book, I do not include them into profit 
calculations.  
The main independent variable for the current profit analysis is the pricing error ratio. The 
larger the ratio, the higher the proportion of a reversible component of the total daily volatility. I 
estimate the pricing error ratio following the methodology developed by Hasbrouck (1993). First, 
I estimate the vector autoregression (VAR) system with ten lags: 
                                        
                                         
where    is the difference in log midquotes;
7
    is the column vector of three signed trade-related 
variables (a signed trade indicator, signed trading volume, and signed square root of trading 
volume) that allows for a nonlinear relation between returns and trades, and      and      are 
                                                          
6
 Handa and Schwartz (1996) use trade data and benchmark EOD inventory against closing trade. I follow the 
approach of Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) and use EOD midquote as a benchmark. 
7
 Using calendar time for price sampling could result in incomparable estimates of the pricing error, as liquid stocks 
have higher midquote update frequencies than the less liquid ones. To make empirical tests comparable across 
different stocks, I compute intraday returns in tick time. 
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zero-mean serially uncorrelated disturbances. I estimate the VAR on the day-by-day basis. Next, 
I invert the VAR to obtain the vector moving average (VMA) representation: 
     
        
              
        
          
     
        
              
        
          
Using the return equation from the VMA model, I estimate the transitory price component: 
                                          
where     ∑   
  
      and     ∑   
  
     .  
The estimate of    shows the sum of expected future price updates given current and past 
shocks to return and trading.  
The pricing error variance can be computed as: 
  
  ∑[     ]      [
  
  
]
 
   
 
I estimate the pricing error ratio as a square root of the pricing error variance scaled by the 
volatility of the log of midquote price: 
                  
  
       
 
It is important to note that the Hasbrouck (1993) methodology estimates the lower bound 
for the pricing error. It assumes that the public information set includes only past returns, volume 
and trading direction. I acknowledge that pricing errors of a higher magnitude may be obtained 
with a more sophisticated methodology.
8
 However, underestimating the magnitude of the pricing 
error is unlikely to lead to a different conclusion about the relation between the pricing error and 
                                                          
8
 For example, Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) apply the Kalman filter to estimate the impact of high-
frequency traders on mispricing. 
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liquidity provision, as long as my estimate of the pricing error is increasing in the magnitude of 
the true pricing error. 
Table 1.5 reports the summary statistics for profit components and the pricing error ratio. 
Most aggregate limit order trading profit comes from reversals and spread. Profit estimates for 
the Canadian market are significantly larger than those obtained for the US market, which 
implies that the latter has lower execution costs for marketable orders. Estimated mean pricing 
error ratios are between 1.2 and 2.5%. This does not mean, however, that price inefficiencies 
have low economic significance. Hasbrouck’s (1993) methodology provides an estimate of the 
lower bound of the unobserved pricing error and the true economic significance of the pricing 
error is likely to be greater than estimated. 
I estimate the relation between the limit order trading profit and the pricing error ratio with 
the following linear model: 
                                                                             
where          is the total profit or one of the profit components;                     is the 
pricing error ratio;            is the average percentage effective spread;           is the 
average number of trades per price movement; and               is the total daily return 
magnitude. All variables are estimated on the stock-day level and standardized across stocks. 
The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1.6. Consistent with the predictions of 
Nagel (2012), one standard deviation increase in the pricing error ratio corresponds to an 
increase in the total limit order trading profits of 4-17%. This translates into a $92.3 increase in 
profit per price movement in the Canadian sample and $76.5, $9.6 and $8.8 increases in the U.S. 
large, medium and small samples.
9
 These estimates are adjusted for volatility, volume and 
                                                          
9
 Although the profit estimates appear to be very large, they are associated with substantial risk. For instance, in the 
TSX sample, the ratio of the profit median to the standard deviation is less than 0.1. 
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spread. Since the pricing error ratio captures the reversible component of volatility, it is more 
closely related with the spread and reversal components than the end-of-day position component 
of the total profit. There is significant correlation between the end-of-day position profit and the 
pricing error ratio for the Canadian and US small stocks. This suggests that, consistent with the 
predictions of Hendershott and Menkveld (2014), liquidity providers may take advantage of 
price pressures to manage their inventories. 
1.6. Conclusions 
This paper studies contrarian liquidity provision during price fluctuations. Academic 
researchers and regulators often voice concerns that liquidity providers have incentives to scale 
back during large intraday price movements; thus, exacerbating them. These concerns are 
fostered by the literature on evaporating liquidity that suggests that the risks and constraints of 
market making lead to the equilibrium where liquidity providers scale back during daily and 
multiple-day price movements to benefit from resulting price reversals.  
I alleviate the above concerns for intraday price movements by showing that, during 
intraday price movements, contrarian incentive dominates the incentive to scale back from 
liquidity provision. Consistent with competitive contrarian trading, liquidity provision is 
increasing in the magnitude of intraday price movements. This result implies that the low-
liquidity equilibrium suggested by the literature on evaporating liquidity for daily and multiple-
day price fluctuations does not typically hold for intraday ones. Liquidity providers typically 
have enough capacity to intensify contrarian liquidity provision with the magnitude of intraday 
price movements. 
 Although contrarian liquidity provision increases in the magnitude of intraday price 
movements, I find some evidence consistent with the scaling back of liquidity providers 
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proposed by the literature on evaporating liquidity. Specifically, limit order depth is withdrawn 
as intraday price movements develop and are repositioned to the quotes that are closer to the 
pivot point. However, the economic significance of such repositioning is small and decreasing in 
the magnitude of price movements. This result suggests that some intraday traders engage in the 
reversal strategies described in the literature on evaporating liquidity. 
Enhanced liquidity provision during large price movements is consistent with the 
profitability of reversal trading strategies developed by several studies. These studies assume that 
price inefficiency serves as compensation for liquidity provision. I support this assumption by 
finding that the aggregate profits of limit order traders increase with the intraday pricing error. 
Moreover, I find some evidence that pricing errors assist limit order traders in managing end-of-
day positions.  
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Figure 1.1. Expected price correction and depth 
The figure shows the expected price correction and contrarian best quote depth aggregated by return magnitude percentiles. The 
expected price correction is adjusted for the return direction, so it represents the transitory component of the contemporaneous price. 
Contrarian depth is the depth of the best quote in the direction of return. The first figure represents the Canadian TSX60 sample, while 
the second, third and fourth figures represent US large, medium and small stocks, respectively. 
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TAQ Large 
 
TAQ Medium 
 
TAQ Small 
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Figure 1.2. Limit order book dynamics during price movements 
The figure shows limit order book depth dynamics during five midquote updates before the pivot point. The top plots correspond to 
intervals with a return magnitude below the 90
th
 percentile, and the bottom plots correspond to the intervals with return above the 90
th
 
percentile. The left plots report depth dynamics exactly at the future best contrarian quote, and the right plots report aggregate depth 
dynamics at all limit order book layers that undercut the future best contrarian quote. 
 
 
Net depth placed at the future best contrarian pivot quote, 
non-EPMs 
 
Sum of net depth placed at the limit order book layers better than future best 
contrarian pivot quote, non-EPMs 
 
Net depth placed at the future best contrarian pivot quote, 
EPMs 
 
Sum of net depth placed at the limit order book layers better than future best 
contrarian pivot quote, EPMs 
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Table 1.1. Intraday summary statistics 
The table reports intraday summary statistics for the intraday price movements.        is the 
absolute return,       ,          is the number of shares traded in the direction and against the 
direction of return, accordingly.        is the difference between        and         . 
         is the time that the price moves in the same direction.                  is the 
number of midquote updates in the price movements. Panel A shows the coefficients for the 
price movements with absolute return below the 90
th
 percentile, and Panel B shows the 
coefficients for the sample of returns above the 90
th
 percentile. 
Panel A: Non-EPMs 
TSX60 Mean Median Std 
           2.444 1.652 2.427 
               308 0 7,295 
                 157 0 10,095 
               151 0 12,042 
                  10.159 0.960 42.897 
                  1.529 1 0.925 
                 24,303,780   
TAQ Large Mean Median Std 
           1.370 1.029 1.221 
               1,824 0 15,950 
                 795 0 10,548 
               1,029 0 12,134 
                  3.469 0.040 22.630 
                   1.572 1 0.895 
                 28,302,974   
TAQ Medium Mean Median Std 
           1.625 1.160 1.925 
               163 0 1,831 
                 65 0 1,431 
               98 0 1,772 
                  4.110 0.033 20.134 
                  1.534 1 0.980 
                 25,883,432   
TAQ Small Mean Median Std 
           2.074 1.468 2.480 
               100 0 1,607 
                 41 0 1,088 
               58 0 1,450 
                  5.369 0.051 35.423 
                  1.548 1 0.971 
                 20,602,427   
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Panel B: EPMs 
TSX60 Mean Median Std 
           13.057 10.775 9.214 
               2,362 300 30,426 
                 941 0 25,408 
               1,421 200 34,021 
                  33.549 6.500 117.748 
                  3.707 3 2.493 
                 2,703,496   
TAQ Large Mean Median Std 
           5.255 4.112 3.698 
               10,519 2,549 49,768 
                 5,047 700 30,699 
               5,472 1,400 33,129 
                  22.242 4.614 73.572 
                  5.114 5 2.496 
                 3,145,945   
TAQ Medium Mean Median Std 
           7.842 5.959 45.318 
               1,156 301 6,512 
                 424 0 5,873 
               732 203 6,680 
                  23.343 5.060 72.534 
                  4.913 4 3.363 
                 2,877,966   
TAQ Small Mean Median Std 
           9.586 7.110 27.496 
               638 100 5,022 
                 236 0 2,933 
               402 95 3,870 
                  27.286 4.023 111.422 
                  4.632 4 3.247 
                 2,291,077   
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Table 1.2. Probit regressions 
The table reports coefficients and marginal effects of a probit model described in Section 5.1. 
The dependent variable is the probability that the current midquote update is the last one in the 
sequence of same-directional midquote updates.         is the absolute cumulative return 
accumulated since the beginning of a price movement.        is the net number of shares 
traded in the direction of return, and          is the percentage effective spread. Panel A 
shows the coefficients for the price movements with absolute return below 90
th
 percentile and 
Panel B shows the coefficients for the sample of returns above 90
th
 percentile. P-values are 
given in parentheses. 
Panel A: Non-EPMs 
 TSX60 TAQ Large TAQ Medium TAQ Small 
           0.267 0.015 0.278 0.308 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
            0.060 0.210 0.054 0.025 
 0.022 0.080 0.020 0.009 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
                       -0.002 -0.034 -0.292 -0.340 
 -0.001 -0.013 -0.109 -0.127 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
             -0.022 -1.709 -0.053 -0.035 
 -0.008 -0.653 -0.020 -0.013 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.007 0.020 0.003 0.002 
Panel B: EPMs    
 TSX60 TAQ Large TAQ Medium TAQ Small 
           -1.242 -1.287 -0.900 -0.880 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
            0.073 0.137 0.009 0.009 
 0.021 0.033 0.002 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
                       -0.004 -0.032 -0.071 -0.173 
 -0.001 -0.008 -0.020 -0.048 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
             -0.175 -4.716 -0.028 -0.068 
 -0.050 -1.146 -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.129 0.085 0.008 0.010 
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Table 1.3. Intraday price movements 
The table reports statistics for key variables of interest during price movements with the magnitude above 90
th
 
percentile (EPMs) and below 90
th
 percentile (non-EPMs).                   is the deviation of price from 
the expected underlying efficient price as estimated in the Data and Methodology section.            is the 
best ask(bid) depth if the return is positive(negative) and               is the depth of the opposite best 
quote.            is the number of shares traded through marketable buy(sell) orders per one-cent move of 
best ask(bid) quote during positive (negative) price movement and               is estimated accordingly the 
opposite best quote.           is the net volume imbalance divided by return in basis points. **, *** 
correspond to the statistical significance at 0.05% and 0.01%. 
TSX EPM non-EPM difference 
                      7.675 1.433 6.242*** 
                   2,034 1,238 796*** 
                      1,140 838 303*** 
                   826 304 523*** 
                      402 124 277*** 
                       913 450 463*** 
TAQ Large EPM non-EPM difference 
                      3.390 0.889 2.501*** 
                   1,216 870 346*** 
                      1,485 1,536 -51*** 
                   2,654 1,670 984*** 
                      1,276 688 588*** 
                       7,470 3,547 3,923*** 
           EPM non-EPM difference 
                      4.809 0.994 3.815*** 
                   271 221 50*** 
                      333 319 14*** 
                   353 175 178*** 
                      133 63 70*** 
                       832 364 468*** 
           EPM non-EPM difference 
                      5.894 1.276 4.618*** 
                   203 178 25*** 
                      239 240 -1** 
                   178 106 72*** 
                      69 38 30*** 
                       315 129 186*** 
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Table 1.4. Dynamics of limit order book depth 
The table reports net depth placement dynamics around the future best pivot quotes during five ticks before the 
price reaches the pivot point. The best contrarian quote at pivot is the best ask (bid) quote at the turning point 
of the positive (negative) price movement. The best non-contrarian quote at pivot is the best bid (ask) quote at 
the turning point of the positive (negative) price movement. Limit order book layers that are better or worse 
than the future best pivot quotes are identified accordingly. The net depth is estimated as non-marketable share 
volume placed minus cancelled at the given layer of the limit order book. Panel A shows the coefficients for 
the price movements with absolute return below 90
th
 percentile, and Panel B shows the coefficients for the 
sample of returns above the 90
th
 percentile. P-values are given in parentheses. 
Panel A: non-EPMs 
ticks 
to 
pivot 
best 
contrarian 
quote 
at pivot 
1  
cent 
better 
2 
cents 
better 
3 
cents 
better 
4 
cents 
better 
5 
cents 
better 
6 
cents 
better 
7 
cents 
better 
8 
cents 
better 
9 
cents 
better 
10 
cents 
better 
10+  
cents 
better 
0 261.6 -75.9 -8.0 -2.7 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -3.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.20) (0.27) (0.00) (0.77) (0.15) (0.39) (0.00) 
1 168.0 -22.7 -8.8 -6.5 -2.0 -0.4 -0.6 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.90) (0.20) 
2 133.4 -17.4 -8.2 -7.0 -2.2 -0.5 -0.6 -2.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.63) (0.14) (0.03) (0.23) 
3 127.3 -14.1 -11.9 -7.4 -1.9 -0.4 -0.5 -2.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.71) (0.72) (0.00) 
4 128.4 -9.4 -11.7 -8.3 -1.6 -0.2 0.7 -2.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 2.2 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.12) (0.00) (0.54) (0.96) (0.78) (0.00) 
5 132.1 -8.9 -6.3 -8.2 -2.1 -0.4 -0.1 -2.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 5.1 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.27) (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.14) (0.00) 
 
 1  
cent 
worse 
2  
cents 
worse 
3  
cents 
worse 
4  
cents 
worse 
5 
cents 
worse 
6  
cents 
worse 
7  
cents 
worse 
8  
cents 
worse 
9  
cents 
worse 
10  
cents 
worse 
10+  
cents 
worse 
0  34.3 10.3 0.3 0.3 -1.8 -4.8 -5.9 -2.9 -2.8 -3.5 20.6 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1  25.3 2.4 -2.7 -1.2 -2.6 -2.8 -4.4 -3.9 -2.9 -3.5 35.2 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2  17.7 0.7 -2.9 -2.4 -2.5 -1.9 -4.5 -3.5 -2.9 -2.7 45.4 
  (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3  18.4 -0.2 -2.6 -2.2 -2.2 -2.5 -4.1 -3.5 -3.4 -2.9 54.5 
  (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4  17.4 0.2 -3.7 -2.6 -1.7 -2.2 -4.4 -2.9 -2.8 -1.7 50.3 
  (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
5  19.4 -0.5 -3.4 -2.1 -2.2 -2.4 -4.5 -3.7 -3.1 0.9 55.2 
  (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) 
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ticks 
to 
pivot 
best non-
contrarian 
quote 
at pivot 
1  
cent 
better 
2 
cents 
better 
3 
cents 
better 
4 
cents 
better 
5 
cents 
better 
6 
cents 
better 
7 
cents 
better 
8 
cents 
better 
9 
cents 
better 
10 
cents 
better 
10+  
cents 
better 
0 348.5 -27.4 -5.4 -3.6 -1.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) 
1 184.0 -26.1 -7.6 -4.7 -2.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.6 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -1.0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) 
2 105.4 -25.5 -8.8 -5.7 -2.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
3 75.2 -23.9 -8.2 -5.3 -1.9 -0.8 -0.7 -1.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.43) (0.00) 
4 58.7 -21.7 -7.5 -5.8 -2.5 -0.7 -0.6 -1.7 -0.5 0.1 0.3 -1.8 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.19) (0.00) 
5 44.3 -16.6 -6.0 -5.1 -2.6 -1.0 -1.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.1 0.0 -2.7 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00) (0.87) (0.88) (0.00) 
 
 1  
cent 
worse 
2  
cents 
worse 
3  
cents 
worse 
4  
cents 
worse 
5 
cents 
worse 
6  
cents 
worse 
7  
cents 
worse 
8  
cents 
worse 
9  
cents 
worse 
10  
cents 
worse 
10+  
cents 
worse 
0  33.6 -3.2 -5.6 2.5 3.5 1.7 -1.6 1.2 1.7 -1.6 83.6 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1  130.0 52.2 3.5 2.7 1.8 0.3 -2.3 -2.2 0.4 -1.5 67.8 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) 
2  82.8 116.6 58.6 8.1 2.8 0.0 -1.5 -2.6 -2.9 -2.1 56.5 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3  25.2 96.4 125.1 47.0 6.3 -0.1 -1.9 -2.4 -2.5 -3.5 46.5 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4  -6.8 44.6 109.9 90.2 44.1 1.5 -1.9 -1.7 0.0 -4.1 30.6 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) 
5  -21.0 9.0 60.1 68.4 91.9 52.9 -2.2 -5.1 0.1 -0.2 26.8 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.90) (0.80) (0.00) 
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Panel B: EPMs 
ticks 
to 
pivot 
best 
contrarian 
quote 
at pivot 
1  
cent 
better 
2 
cents 
better 
3 
cents 
better 
4 
cents 
better 
5 
cents 
better 
6 
cents 
better 
7 
cents 
better 
8 
cents 
better 
9 
cents 
better 
10 
cents 
better 
10+  
cents 
better 
0 83.0 4.2 1.0 -11.4 -5.6 -2.6 -5.0 -1.2 -3.4 -2.7 -2.2 -24.5 
 (0.00) (0.40) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1 65.2 -24.1 17.2 -3.3 -5.5 -1.3 -3.3 -2.2 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -17.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2 45.9 -8.3 -11.8 1.7 1.0 -1.0 -1.9 -2.5 -1.7 -0.9 0.6 -11.8 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.47) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) 
3 52.6 -2.3 -24.8 -12.8 1.2 0.2 -2.5 -3.1 -1.3 -0.7 -1.7 -8.5 
 (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) 
4 58.6 3.6 -18.6 -26.9 -6.6 0.7 -2.8 -2.9 -0.9 -0.1 -3.8 -6.3 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.19) (0.00) 
5 59.4 5.5 -15.8 -28.2 -19.5 -1.2 -5.1 -3.5 -0.5 0.2 -2.2 -6.0 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.52) (0.29) (0.00) 
 
 1  
cent 
worse 
2  
cents 
worse 
3  
cents 
worse 
4  
cents 
worse 
5 
cents 
worse 
6  
cents 
worse 
7  
cents 
worse 
8  
cents 
worse 
9  
cents 
worse 
10  
cents 
worse 
10+  
cents 
worse 
0  9.9 33.5 5.9 12.9 5.5 -1.5 1.6 0.4 -0.8 -1.7 50.6 
  (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.40) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
1  16.4 31.5 2.8 3.8 0.9 0.9 -2.3 -2.1 -1.7 -3.0 61.7 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2  22.2 17.1 1.5 -1.4 -0.2 0.2 -3.7 -3.8 -1.8 -3.6 62.8 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.24) (0.75) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3  20.0 7.4 -2.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -3.7 -3.4 -2.3 -2.7 71.7 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.67) (0.54) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4  20.4 2.8 -3.8 -3.7 0.1 -1.7 -3.4 -3.8 -0.7 -1.6 73.9 
  (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.88) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.01) (0.00) 
5  20.5 2.9 -3.0 -4.0 0.7 -2.1 -3.7 -3.4 -1.6 -1.1 74.1 
  (0.00) (0.16) (0.11) (0.00) (0.45) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.16) (0.00) 
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ticks 
to 
pivot 
best non-
contrarian 
quote 
at pivot 
1  
cent 
better 
2 
cents 
better 
3 
cents 
better 
4 
cents 
better 
5 
cents 
better 
6 
cents 
better 
7 
cents 
better 
8 
cents 
better 
9 
cents 
better 
10 
cents 
better 
10+  
cents 
better 
0 270.1 12.3 5.8 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -9.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -10.5 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.19) (0.44) (0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1 126.4 2.5 3.9 -0.8 -0.1 -0.5 -1.4 -4.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -9.5 
 (0.00) (0.27) (0.07) (0.28) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2 38.7 -3.7 -0.8 -1.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.3 -1.7 -0.7 -0.5 -1.7 -5.6 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.67) (0.13) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) 
3 13.7 -8.5 -4.0 -2.6 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 1.8 -0.2 -0.4 -2.2 -3.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
4 7.6 -14.6 -3.6 -3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 7.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -2.9 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.84) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
5 10.2 -15.4 -2.4 -3.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.7 12.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -2.5 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.41) (0.00) 
 
 1  
cent 
worse 
2  
cents 
worse 
3  
cents 
worse 
4  
cents 
worse 
5 
cents 
worse 
6  
cents 
worse 
7  
cents 
worse 
8  
cents 
worse 
9  
cents 
worse 
10  
cents 
worse 
10+  
cents 
worse 
0  133.8 -4.0 -35.2 -2.9 -8.5 -6.0 -14.7 -9.6 -1.4 -7.2 -33.7 
  (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
1  148.0 180.6 12.6 -13.5 -3.9 -5.1 -8.0 -8.9 -4.0 -3.7 -23.3 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2  52.3 165.0 96.0 17.2 5.0 -0.3 -2.9 -5.1 -7.7 -2.4 -9.6 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3  0.4 116.0 148.3 72.7 21.2 5.1 2.2 -2.0 -7.9 -4.7 -9.2 
  (0.88) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4  -31.3 51.0 146.7 125.7 52.2 19.9 9.6 3.8 -5.8 -5.6 -3.2 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) 
5  -42.7 14.6 100.9 137.8 83.0 40.7 18.3 9.9 -2.2 -5.1 -1.3 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.78) 
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Table 1.5. Profits summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the estimated profits from liquidity provision and daily 
pricing errors.                is the liquidity providers’ profit component corresponding to 
spread and reversals.                 is the liquidity providers’ profit component 
corresponding to end-of-day position profits.              is the sum of the two components. 
All profit components are estimated in dollars and scaled by the number of reversals per day. 
                    is the proportion of intraday price variance attributable to the pricing 
error. 
TSX60 Mean Median Std 
              632.4 230.1 2186.4 
                438.1 153.0 1536.4 
                 194.4 30.2 1170.8 
                     2.45% 0.99% 5.46% 
TAQ Large Mean Median Std 
              65.9 15.6 801.3 
                69.1 15.1 559.8 
                 -4.1 0.0 361.5 
                     1.48% 0.88% 2.25% 
TAQ Medium Mean Median Std 
              2.7 1.0 61.3 
                3.1 1.1 44.9 
                 -0.5 0.0 21.6 
                     1.20% 0.63% 2.66% 
TAQ Small Mean Median Std 
              3.3 0.6 54.6 
                3.3 0.7 39.9 
                 -0.5 0.0 18.9 
                     2.26% 0.80% 7.87% 
 
  
38 
 
Table 1.6. Profits regression 
The table reports regression coefficients of the following model: 
                                                                             
where the dependent variable is the total profit of liquidity provision, profits from reversals and spread and 
profits from accumulated end of day position.                   is the proportion of intraday price 
variance attributable to the pricing error,          is the average percentage effective spread,         is 
the number of trades per day and             is the daily return magnitude. Regressions are estimated 
with fixed effects. All variables are standardized. P-values corresponding to double clustered standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Dependent – Total profits of limit order trading 
 TSX60 TAQ Large TAQ Medium TAQ Small 
                   0.0422 0.0955 0.1566 0.1619 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
          -0.0816 -0.0106 0.0108 -0.0218 
 (0.01) (0.60) (0.68) (0.46) 
         0.0754 0.0381 0.0472 0.0666 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.19) (0.17) 
             0.0593 -0.0397 -0.1092 -0.0735 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) 
         0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Panel B: Dependent – Profits from spread and reversals 
 TSX60 TAQ Large TAQ Medium TAQ Small 
                   0.0316 0.1528 0.0935 0.1113 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
          -0.0786 -0.0339 -0.0113 -0.0582 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.63) (0.03) 
         0.0676 0.0739 0.0723 0.1179 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.02) 
             0.0555 -0.0473 -0.0484 -0.0688 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) 
        0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Panel C: Dependent – Profits from end-of-day position 
 TSX60 TAQ Large TAQ Medium TAQ Small 
                   0.0533 -0.0269 0.0405 0.0643 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.66) (0.00) 
          -0.0725 0.0298 0.0424 0.0290 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.08) (0.28) 
         0.0607 -0.0304 -0.0156 -0.0389 
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.48) (0.36) 
             0.0592 -0.0146 -0.1487 -0.0442 
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.07) (0.03) 
         0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Chapter 2. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND EXTREME PRICE 
MOVEMENTS 
2.1. Introduction 
In modern markets, high frequency traders (HFTs) play an important role in providing 
liquidity (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Menkveld, 2013; Malinova, Park and Riordan, 2014, Conrad, 
Wahal and Xiang, 2015). Generally, the rise of HFT has been accompanied by a reduction in trading 
costs (Angel, Harris and Spatt, 2011; Jones, 2013; Harris, 2013) and an increase in price efficiency 
(Carrion, 2013; Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and 
Vega, 2014). Nevertheless, liquidity provision by HFTs is endogenous as they are typically not 
obligated to stabilize markets in periods of stress. A growing literature finds that endogenous 
liquidity providers (ELPs) often withdraw from the market during such periods (Raman, Robe and 
Yadav, 2014; Bongaerts and Van Achter, 2015; Cespa and Vives, 2015; Korajczyk and Murphy, 
2015; Anand and Venkataraman, 2016). The focus of this study is HFT behavior during stressful 
conditions. 
We define stressful periods as unexpected and rapidly developing extreme price movements 
(EPMs) that belong to the 99.9
th
 percentile of the return distribution. While a growing body of work 
examines HFT activity during normal conditions, less attention has been given to periods of market 
stress such as EPMs. Our main finding is that, on average, HFTs trade in the opposite direction of 
EPMs and supply liquidity to non-high frequency traders (nHFTs) by absorbing their trade 
imbalances. This result holds even during the largest EPMs and during the times when nHFTs 
demand substantial amounts of liquidity. Notably, HFTs supply liquidity both to the EPMs that 
eventually reverse and the EPMs that result in permanent price changes. This means that an average 
HFT trade during extreme price movements provides liquidity to aggressive, occasionally informed, 
nHFTs. 
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Even though EPMs occur quickly, they consist of multiple sequential trades. If HFT 
algorithms are designed to stop providing liquidity during EPMs, technology would allow them to 
withdraw limit orders as EPMs develop. Yet the results imply that the algorithms are designed to 
remain in the market, likely because doing so is profitable. Although revenue estimates are noisy, 
we find evidence that the revenues are greater on days when EPMs occur. Despite the enhanced 
revenue potential, the data show that HFTs do not cause EPMs. Our results complement those of 
Bessembinder, Carrion, Tuttle and Venkataraman (2016), who show that liquidity provision 
increases around large uninformed predictable trades. In our setting EPMs are generally 
unpredictable and are occasionally informed, yet the incentive to provide liquidity remains. Our 
findings expand the understanding of resiliency of modern markets in stressful times.  
Although HFTs stabilize prices during an average EPM, we find clear limits to HFT 
liquidity provision. HFT liquidity supply is outstripped by their liquidity demand when more than 
one stock simultaneously undergoes an EPM (we refer to these instances as co-EPMs). We show 
that during such periods, HFTs accumulate substantial position risk, which likely triggers risk 
controls, particularly for their liquidity supplying strategies. Focusing on one exceptionally large co-
EPM, the 2010 Flash Crash, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2016) find that HFTs withdrew 
from liquidity provision. Reflecting on the Crash, the regulators have expressed concern that 
incentives to provide liquidity are deficient during market-wide periods of stress (CFTC-SEC, 
2011). Our findings generalize these results and deepen our understanding of market-wide liquidity 
shortages and offer evidence in support of the regulators’ view. 
Theory suggests that ELPs may choose several ways of reacting to order imbalances. Traders 
described by Grossman and Miller (1988) choose to supply liquidity during order imbalances. On 
the contrary, the predatory traders of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) opt to demand liquidity. 
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The back-runners of Yang and Zhu (2015) supply liquidity until they recognize an institutional 
trading pattern and then switch to demanding liquidity. In our setting, HFT behavior during an 
average EPM is more consistent with that described by Grossman and Miller (1988), although the 
data point to net HFT liquidity demand during co-EPMs and occasional back-running for long EPM 
sequences. 
 
2.2. Data, EPM detection and summary statistics 
2.2.1. HFT data 
The HFT data come from NASDAQ and span two years: 2008 and 2009. These data have 
been previously used by Carrion (2013), Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014), and O’Hara, 
Yao and Ye (2014), among others. For each trade the dataset contains an indicator for whether an 
HFT or an nHFT participates on the liquidity-supplying or the liquidity-demanding side of the trade. 
When preparing the data NASDAQ identified 26 firms that act as independent HFT proprietary 
trading firms based on its knowledge of the firm’s activity. A firm is identified by NASDAQ as an 
HFT if it trades frequently, holds small intraday inventory positions, and ends the day with a near 
zero inventory. HFTs on NASDAQ have no obligation to stabilize prices during stressful times 
(Bessembinder, Hao and Lemmon, 2011; Clark-Joseph, Ye and Zi, 2016) and so are ideal 
participants to study liquidity provision by ELPs. 
The data allow us to directly observe HFT liquidity provision and demand. We are subject to 
the same limitations as the abovementioned studies, mainly that we cannot observe individual HFT 
activity and that we only observe trading on NASDAQ. Although trades on NASDAQ make up 30-
40% of all trading activity in the sample stocks, it is a possible that during EPMs HFTs provide 
liquidity on NASDAQ while taking it from the other markets. We are unable to refute this 
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possibility. Nonetheless, we believe that such liquidity transfer is unlikely as liquidity provision on 
NASDAQ is not systematically more attractive than it is on other venues during the sample period. 
 
2.2.2. EPM identification 
We identify EPMs as extreme changes in the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) 
midquotes. The use of midquotes instead of trade prices allows us to reduce the effect of the bid-ask 
bounce. In untabulated results we find similar effects when using trade prices. We obtain the 
midquotes from the NYSE Trade and Quote database (TAQ) after adjusting the data according to 
the recommendations of Holden and Jacobsen (2014). Specifically, we (i) interpolate the times of 
trades and the times of NBBO quotes within a second, (ii) adjust for withdrawn quotes, (iii) delete 
locked and crossed NBBO quotes, and (iv) delete trades reported while the NBBO is locked or 
crossed. To avoid focusing on price dislocations that may be caused by market opening and closing 
procedures, we only consider trading activity between 9:35 a.m. and 3:55 p.m. 
Using the filtered TAQ midquotes, we compute 10-second absolute midquote returns. The 
choice of the 10-second sampling frequency is based on two offsetting considerations. On the one 
hand, detecting EPMs that result from brief liquidity dislocations requires a relatively short 
sampling interval. On the other hand, a sampling interval that is too short may split an EPM into 
several price changes that are not large enough to be captured by the identification procedure. The 
choice of 10-second intervals is a compromise between these two considerations. As a robustness 
check, we repeat the main analyses for several alternative interval lengths: 1 second, 5 seconds, 30 
seconds and 1 minute. The results are qualitatively similar. 
The NASDAQ HFT dataset contains 120 stocks divided into three size categories: large, 
medium and small. There are 40 stocks in each category. Medium and small stocks trade rather 
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infrequently, and there are usually insufficient observations to draw statistically robust conclusions 
about HFT and nHFT activity. The main analysis therefore focuses on the 40 largest stocks. In a 
similar application, and driven by similar considerations, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Ebens 
(2001) also focus on the largest stocks when detecting EPMs. The sample of 40 largest stocks 
contains 45.2 million 10-second intervals. 
We use three approaches to identify EPMs. The first approach is straightforward and simply 
labels all intervals that belong to the 99.9
th
 percentile of 10-second absolute midpoint returns for 
each stock as EPMs. The second approach is more sophisticated and accounts for predictable return 
correlations in time and across firms. First, for each day we estimate a short-term market model of 
the following form: 
                                                               ,  (1) 
 
where       is stock  ’s return over the ten-second interval  , and      is the return on the S&P 500 
ETF (SPRD). Second, we use the coefficients from the previous day’s regressions to compute 
residuals of the current day’s model. Third, we label all intervals with residuals that belong to the 
99.9
th
 percentile as EPMs. As a robustness check, we use in-sample residuals, with the model 
estimated over the full sample. The results are similar. 
Both approaches select intervals with the largest absolute returns out of 45.2 million 10-
second intervals, and define them as EPMs. The intuitive nature of these techniques is appealing, yet 
they come with two limitations. First, the 99.9 cutoffs are stock-specific and therefore implicitly 
assume that each stock is equally likely to undergo an EPM. Consequently, the 99.9 technique may 
(over-) under-sample stocks that are (less) more prone to EPMs. The second limitation is that the 
techniques (especially the first one) are agnostic to volatility conditions and therefore tend to 
oversample periods of high volatility. We suggest that understanding HFT behavior is relevant 
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regardless of accompanying volatility. Nevertheless, to formally address this limitation, we repeat 
the analysis using a third EPM detection technique, the Lee and Mykland’s (2012) methodology, 
which accounts for contemporaneous (local) volatility.  
Throughout the main manuscript, we use the results obtained from the second identification 
technique where EPMs are based on the residuals from Equation (1). A summary of results obtained 
using the first and the third techniques is reported in the robustness section. The results obtained 
from these techniques are in line with those reported in the paper. 
Finally, in unreported results, we find that the 99.9
th
 percentile returns closely correspond to 
the 99.9
th
 percentile of trade imbalances. An EPM identification that focuses on the largest 
imbalances rather than the largest returns produces a similar sample.  
 
2.2.3. Summary statistics  
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 45,200 EPMs in Panel A and, for 
comparison, the full sample of 10-second intervals in Panel B. The statistics expectedly show that 
returns, trading activity, and bid-ask spreads are considerably larger during the EPMs than during an 
average 10-second period. The average absolute EPM return is 0.478%, which is more than 17 times 
(or about 10 standard deviations) larger than the full-sample return. Trading activity is also 
substantially higher; increasing from 18 trades per 10 seconds to 72 trades. Dollar trading volume 
increases from $76,076 to $462,950, and share volume increases by a similar magnitude. Finally, 
the quoted and relative spreads nearly double during EPMs suggesting that liquidity is impaired 
during these events.  
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The number of positive EPMs is approximately equal to the number of negative EPMs. In 
unreported results, we find that EPM characteristics such as the absolute return magnitude, trading 
volume, and quoted spreads are similar for positive and negative EPMs. HFT and nHFT behavior is 
also similar across these different types of events. The results reported in the remainder of the paper 
report combined positive and negative EPMs. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 report the EPM time series. In both figures, the scale of the vertical axis 
is logarithmic. Figure 2.1 reports the intraday frequency of EPMs, with 50.3% of the events 
occurring in the first hour of trading. This pattern is consistent with studies that document high price 
volatility and information uncertainly in the morning hours (Chan, Christie and Schultz, 1995; 
Egginton, 2014). The remaining EPMs are distributed relatively evenly throughout the day, with a 
moderate increase near the end of the day.
10
 Figure 2.2 plots the daily frequency of EPMs during the 
2008-2009 sample period. Most EPMs (66.3%) occur during the months of September, October and 
November of 2008, the height of the financial crisis. 
 
2.3. HFT and nHFT activity around EPMs 
In this section, we show that HFTs provide liquidity to nHFTs during a typical EPM, even 
when the EPM is very large and even when the price change is permanent. We also show that HFT 
liquidity supply is overshadowed by their demand when several stocks undergo simultaneous EPMs 
and also during long sequences of EPMs. We also show that liquidity provision during an average 
EPM is profitable, yet we find no evidence that HFTs trigger EPMs to benefit from this profitability. 
 
                                                          
10
 Aitken, Cumming and Zhan (2015) find that proliferation of HFT has reduced instances of end-of-day price 
manipulation. 
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 2.3.1. A typical EPM 
To measure HFT activity during EPMs, we use directional trade imbalances computed as the 
difference between trading activity in the direction of the EPM and trading activity in the opposite 
direction:                  and                 , where      is HFT 
liquidity demand,      is HFT liquidity supply, and the superscripts + (-) indicate activity in the 
same (opposite) direction of the EPM return. For example, if HFTs demand 20 shares of liquidity in 
the direction of the price movement and demand 1 share in the opposite direction, HFT
D
 is +19. 
Similarly, if HFTs supply 20 shares of liquidity against the direction of the EPM and supply 4 
shares in the direction of the EPM, HFT
S
 is -16. We compute similar metrics for nHFTs. 
 In addition, we introduce two net imbalance metrics, HFT
NET
 (nHFT
NET
) computed as the 
sum of HFT
D
 and HFT
S
 (nHFT
D
 and nHFT
S
). Since liquidity is typically provided against the 
direction of return, (n)HFT
S
 usually has a negative value, and the sum of (n)HFT
D
 and (n)HFT
S
 is in 
effect the difference between liquidity demanding and liquidity providing volume. Net imbalances 
indicate the direction in which net trading activity by a particular trader type is occurring relative to 
the EPM direction. For example, a positive (negative) net HFT imbalance indicates overall trading 
in the direction (opposite) of the EPM.  
To begin the discussion of HFT and nHFT activity around EPMs Figure 2.3 reports the 
cumulative return (CRET) as well as HFT
D
, nHFT
D
 and HFT
NET
 starting 100 seconds prior to an 
average EPM and up to 100 seconds afterwards. We make the following expositional choices. First, 
the figure includes both positive and negative EPMs, and we invert the statistics for the latter. 
Second, we benchmark the signs for HFT and nHFT activity to the EPM return. For example, if the 
EPM return is positive, a negative HFT
D 
ten seconds after the EPM means that HFTs sell the stock 
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via liquidity demanding orders, effectively counteracting the effects of the positive EPM that 
occurred ten seconds earlier. 
Figure 2.3 shows that prices change significantly during the EPM interval, and then revert 
somewhat during the remaining 100 seconds (10 intervals).
11
 There is a large increase in nHFT
D
 
during the EPM, with a share imbalance of more than 5,300. In the meantime, HFT
D
 is about 2,300 
shares. More importantly, HFT
NET
 is negative, indicating that HFT liquidity supply offsets HFT 
liquidity demand and that HFTs absorb volume imbalances created by nHFTs.
12
 
The results in Figure 2.3 provide first evidence on HFT and nHFT behavior around EPMs. 
In Table 2.2, we examine EPM event windows in more detail. Specifically, we focus on event 
windows that span 20 seconds before and after the EPM interval and report liquidity demand and 
supply statistics for HFTs and nHFTs. We find that HFT
NET
 is statistically significant in the 
direction opposite of returns during interval t (the EPM interval) and the two following intervals. 
Statistical significance is preserved when we cluster the standard errors in time. Further, upon 
splitting HFT activity into demand and supply, we observe that HFTs trade in the direction of the 
EPM with their liquidity demanding trades (HFT
D
 is 2,296 shares) and in the opposite direction with 
their liquidity supplying trades (HFT
S
 is 2,539 shares). HFTs provide 243 shares of net liquidity 
against the direction of an average EPM. This finding is contrary to the belief held by some market 
observers that HFTs trade large amounts in the direction of EPMs.  
Is 243 shares too small a quantity to claim that HFTs stabilize prices? The results in Table 
2.2 are simple averages and therefore do not suggest that HFT liquidity provision is limited to 243 
shares per EPM. Rather, 243 is the number of shares that nHFTs demand during an average EPM.  
                                                          
11
 Our reliance on quote midpoints aims to focus the analysis on the permanent component of the security price. This 
said, some non-permanent components remain. Specifically in Figure 2.3, the return slopes downward up to t=0, then 
jumps, and then partly reverses after the EPM. This process is best described as a combination of random walk and 
stationary noise processes.  
12
 The net imbalance metrics are designed so that HFT
NET
=-nHFT
NET
. 
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Beyond being liquidity providers during EPMs, do HFTs trigger EPMs? In the 10-second 
interval starting 20 seconds prior to an EPM (t-20), HFT
NET
 and nHFT
NET
 do not show any 
directionality. However, in t-10 HFTs trade against the direction of the future EPM return.
13
 As 
such, it appears that HFTs do not trigger EPMs. We examine this issue in more detail in a 
subsequent section. 
Following an EPM, HFTs continue to trade in the opposite direction of the EPM return, but 
unlike in interval t they primarily use liquidity demanding trades. Specifically, HFTs demand a net 
of 113 shares against the direction of the preceding EPM return in interval t+10. This suggests that 
HFTs may speed up the reversal process. We study reversals in more detail in the following section.  
 
2.3.2. EPM types: reversals and permanent price changes 
The literature suggests that large price movements can be triggered by at least two types of 
events: information arrival and trade imbalances. A news arrival, for instance, often results in prices 
adjusting rapidly to incorporate information. In an efficient market, such price movements will be 
permanent. Alternatively, trade imbalances usually arise because impatient traders submit large 
volumes of buy or sell orders and push prices away from the fundamental values. Price movements 
arising from such pressures are transitory and are followed by reversals. Figure 2.4 presents an 
illustration. 
Do HFTs provide liquidity to both EPM types? To answer this question, we divide the 
sample into transitory and permanent EPMs. The former are characterized by significant, yet 
temporary, price changes followed by reversals. We identify these as EPMs that revert by more than 
2/3 by the end of a 30-minute period. The latter, permanent, EPMs do not revert by more than 1/3 
                                                          
13
 In Table 2.2, as in Figure 2.3, we benchmark the signs of HFT and nHFT volume to the EPM return. 
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by the end of this period. To allow for a clean separation of the two EPM types, we exclude the 
EPMs that revert by more than 1/3 and less than 2/3; these are 14.2% of the sample. The results are 
robust to using alternative reversal thresholds (e.g., reversals of more than 1/2 of the EPM return), 
time thresholds of 1, 10 and 20 minutes, and allowing reversals to occur by the end of the trading 
day. 
In Table 2.3, we examine the characteristics of the two EPM types and HFT activity around 
them. Despite a significant difference in post-EPM price patterns, other EPM characteristics (i.e., 
returns, trading activity, HFT participation and spreads) are similar across the two types (Panel A). 
For instance, the average absolute return is 0.481% during both a typical transitory and a typical 
permanent EPM. In Panel B, we describe HFT activity around the two EPM types. Consistent with 
the full sample results, HFTs provide liquidity to both types during interval t.  
 
2.3.3. EPM magnitude 
 Although the EPMs in the sample represent the 99.9
th
 percentile of all price movements, the 
setup may obscure the picture for the largest EPMs, during which HFT activity may differ from 
what has been discussed so far. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2016) show that when prices 
reached extraordinary lows during the 2010 flash crash, HFTs withdrew from liquidity provision. So 
far, the results suggest that EPMs are not accompanied by similar withdrawals. But what about the 
largest EPMs? In Table 2.4, we examine if HFT liquidity provision varies in EPM magnitude, and 
particularly if HFTs provide liquidity to the largest of the extreme price movements. 
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics and HFT
NET 
results for EPMs divided into four 
magnitude quartiles, from the relatively small (Q1) to the largest (Q4). As expected, trading volume 
and spreads increase in return magnitude (Panel A). HFT liquidity provision also increases, going 
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from 116 shares in Q1 to 546 shares in Q4 (Panel B). Insofar as these results are generalizable to 
events like the 2010 Flash Crash, they suggest that it was probably not the magnitude of the crash 
that triggered HFT withdrawal. 
 
2.3.4. EPM types: standalone and co-EPMs 
The 2010 Flash Crash was characterized not only by the magnitude of price movements, but 
also by the large number of stocks that were affected. It is possible that liquidity withdrawals during 
the crash were due to the HFT firms’ risk controls that were triggered when accumulated inventories 
reached high levels. The Flash Crash was a uniquely large and rare event, and it is not clear if it 
should be viewed as typical of HFT behavior in instances of multi-stock price movements. To 
examine this issue, we define co-EPMs as those that occur in two or more stocks during the same 
10-second time interval and repeat earlier analyses. 
Panel A of Table 2.5 reports that co-EPMs comprise 57% of the sample. The prevalence of 
co-EPMs should not be surprising given the exceptionally high EPM occurrence during the 2008 
financial crisis when prices of multiple assets experienced large simultaneous movements (Figure 
2.2). An average co-EPM includes 3.5 stocks. The average return is 0.487% during a standalone 
EPM and 0.471% during a co-EPM. Trading activity metrics are noticeably different between the 
two types, with dollar volume during the standalone EPMs being about 74% higher than that during 
the co-EPMs. 
Panel B shows that HFTs supply 1,296 shares of net liquidity during the standalone EPMs. 
In the meantime, they demand 549 shares of net liquidity during the co-EPMs. This reversal in HFT 
behavior is striking. In Figure 2.5, we examine its evolution. To do so, we plot HFT
D
 and HFT
S
 for 
standalone and co-EPMs. As previously, the metrics are computed on a per-stock basis. HFT
D
 and 
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HFT
S
 decline rapidly when more than one stock undergoes simultaneous EPMs. Notably, the 
decline is more pronounced for supply than demand. As such, the risk controls triggered during co-
EPMs appear to affect liquidity supplying strategies more than they affect liquidity demanding 
strategies, giving rise to positive HFT
NET
 during co-EPMs.  
Note that even though HFT activity per stock declines, total inventory accumulated during 
co-EPMs may increase. For instance, inventory accumulated during the 10-stock co-EPM is 7,960 
(= 796  10) shares, more than 6 times the inventory accumulated during the standalone EPMs. As 
such, even though HFTs reduce activity on the per-share basis, the risk of their total positions may 
increase. This risk may be further exacerbated if, in addition to the co-EPM stocks, other stocks in 
the HFT portfolios are experiencing large price movements. Such movements, even if they do not 
qualify as EPMs, may affect total HFT position risk. We examine this issue next.  
 
2.3.5. Co-EPMs and position risk 
To gain a better understanding of the risks assumed by HFTs during co-EPMs, we turn to the 
concept of value at risk (VaR). We caution that our data do not contain capital positions or 
inventories of individual HFTs, so we are unable to estimate the true VaR. Rather, we follow the 
general intuition of VaR analyses and refer to the results as quasi-VaR (QVaR). Specifically, we 
rely on the non-parametric method of Allen, Bali and Tang (2012) and begin by estimating, on a 
daily basis, the 99
th
 percentile of the 10-second absolute returns for the portfolio of sample stocks. 
Note that constituent returns vary during instances of tail portfolio returns. To account for this, we 
estimate average stock returns for each sample stock   during the instances of portfolio tail returns 
on each day  ,      
    . The contribution of individual stocks to the portfolio tail return varies 
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slowly. As such, the composition of portfolio tail returns on day     is a sufficient proxy for the 
expected composition on day  . With this in mind, we compute intraday QVaR as follows: 
          (∑       
           
  
 
 ∑        
           
  
 
)                               
 
where       is the dollar inventory in stock   accumulated by the HFTs during the interval   
valued at the last midquote of the interval. The first term captures potential portfolio losses if the 
EPM is followed by a positive tail return, and the second term captures potential losses if the EPM 
is followed by a negative tail return. We then select the minimum of the two terms to estimate the 
maximum loss. In a nutshell, QVaR estimates the expected dollar loss during the following 10-
second interval if the HFT portfolio experiences an unfavorable 99th percentile return. 
Figure 2.6 shows that QVaR increases steadily in the number of stocks experiencing a co-
EPM. Specifically, it increases from $287 during intervals without EPMs to $936 for standalone 
EPMs, and further to over $5,000 for intervals with more than 10 EPMs. This increase is driven by 
the inventory accumulation in both the stocks undergoing EPMs and in the rest of the portfolio and 
likely explains the HFTs’ tendency to reduce risk exposure on a per-stock basis.  
 
2.3.6. EPM sequences 
Earlier results show that HFTs provide substantial liquidity to the standalone EPMs, yet 
demand liquidity during co-EPMs. In Panel A of Table 2.6, which serves as a companion to Figure 
2.5, we examine HFT sensitivity to the number of stocks in a co-EPM. The sensitivity is high; 
HFT
NET
 switches from being negative during the standalone EPMs to zero for the two-stock co-
EPMs and to being positive for co-EPMs that involve three and more stocks. The results suggest 
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HFT liquidity supply is sensitive to inventory risk. This is consistent with Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2010), who show that market maker strategies depend on 
inventories.  
 Given this fragility, it is possible that HFTs also remain on the sidelines on days with long 
sequences of EPMs, especially if these EPMs have the same return direction. In Panel B of Table 
2.6, we examine if this occurs. The data show that HFTs usually provide net liquidity to the first 
four EPMs in the sequence and reduce net liquidity provision to zero if the sequence continues. 
There is some evidence of positive HFT
NET
 for very long sequences.  
 
2.3.7. Does HFT activity during EPMs differ from their usual behavior? 
Research shows that HFTs usually demand liquidity in the direction of returns (e.g., 
Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014). If this pattern persisted during EPMs, we would observe 
significantly positive and large HFT
NET
. On the contrary, we find that the pattern reverses for 
standalone EPMs. Although the pattern does not reverse for co-EPMs, it is possible that the positive 
HFT-return relation is reduced even for these EPMs. Accounting for return magnitude, HFTs may 
demand less liquidity during the times when multiple stocks undergo EPMs than they normally 
would. To examine this issue, we turn to the following multivariate setting: 
                                                                  (3) 
 
where        is the difference between HFTD and HFTS as discussed earlier;         is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the 10-second interval   in stock   is identified as an EPM and is equal to 
zero otherwise,       is the absolute return,       is the traded share volume,       is the percentage 
quoted spread, and           is a vector of lags for the dependent and each of the independent 
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variables, with             . The variables in the vector are indexed with a subscript  . All 
variables are standardized at the stock level. 
Because the coefficients on the 1EPM dummy are related to returns, they should be interpreted 
jointly with those on the Ret variable. For example in column 1 of Table 2.7, the estimated 
coefficient on the Ret variable confirms that HFTs usually demand liquidity in the direction of 
return. In the meantime, the 1EPM dummy shows that HFTs reduce liquidity demand during EPMs, 
with the incremental effect of -0.798 standard deviations. Having established the basic result, we 
next turn to HFT activity during the previously identified EPM types. Column 2 shows that during 
both transitory and permanent EPMs the normally positive HFT-return relation is significantly 
reduced. In column 3, we find the same result for the standalone and co-EPMs, yet the decline is 
much greater for the standalone EPMs. Similar results emerge in column 4 that accounts for EPM 
magnitude; the normally positive relation between HFT behavior and returns is reduced, more so 
during the largest EPMs. Overall, even in cases when they demand liquidity during the EPM 
episodes (the co-EPM case), HFTs demand considerably less than they normally would.  
 
2.3.8. HFT-return relation within the 10-second intervals 
The 10-second event windows are quite long given the speed of modern trading and may 
conceal nefarious aspects of HFT behavior. Yang and Zhu (2015) propose and van Kervel and 
Menkveld (2015) show that HFTs are able to recognize trading patterns after a period of time and 
switch from supplying liquidity to demanding it. Although van Kervel and Menkveld (2015) focus 
on time horizons that are much longer than ours, even one second is a long enough time for HFT 
algorithms to re-evaluate a trading strategy. It is therefore possible that HFTs supply liquidity at the 
beginning of EPMs yet exacerbate their tail ends. 
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To examine this possibility, in Figure 2.7 we plot second by second cumulative returns, 
HFT, and nHFT activity centered on the largest one-second return during an average EPM. The 
figure shows that prices continue to move in the direction of the largest return for several seconds 
afterwards. If HFT algorithms had been designed to quickly switch from liquidity supply to demand 
after observing large price changes, they would have had sufficient time to do so. The figure 
contains no evidence of HFT
NET
 switching to positive values. If anything, it remains slightly 
negative.
14
 
Although the time aggregation period in Figure 2.7 is finer than that used in the remainder of 
the study, it is still long relative to the usual timing of HFT interactions. It is therefore possible that 
HFT
NET
 is positive at the very beginning of some EPMs, perhaps for a few micro- or milliseconds. 
Because pinpointing the exact time when an EPM begins is next to impossible, we are unable to 
examine this issue. This said, even if short-lived HFT liquidity demand exists at early EPM stages, 
the economic effect of such demand is economically small and does not register in the data. 
 
2.3.9. Profitability of liquidity provision during EPMs 
The data show that HFTs usually provide liquidity to nHFTs during both transitory and 
permanent EPMs. Since HFTs choose to do so, liquidity provision should be profitable. How are 
these profits derived? During positive permanent EPMs as described in Figure 2.4, if a trader limits 
liquidity provision to the size of his existing long inventory, he will have bought low and sold high. 
If however he provides liquidity indiscriminately, in the amount larger than the existing long 
inventory, he may accumulate a money-losing short position. The same logic, but in reverse, applies 
to negative permanent EPMs. 
                                                          
14
 As in Figure 2.3, non-permanent return components are evident, suggesting lagged adjustment in prices. In addition to 
generating momentum after t=0, thus adjustment may generate smoothing prior to t=0. 
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During transitory price movements, when the price first moves up and then down (Figure 
2.4), a skilled trader may profit by initially selling high to the impatient buyers and then buying low 
when the price reverses. The literature shows that providing liquidity during such reversals is 
profitable (Hendershott and Seasholes, 2007; Nagel, 2012; So and Wang, 2014). This strategy does 
not require pre-existing inventory as profits are derived from the inventory accumulated during the 
EPM. In summary, it is possible that HFTs profit from both permanent and transitory EPMs. Next, 
we examine the data for evidence of such profits. 
 Specifically, we estimate HFT trading revenues on EPM days and compare them to the days 
without EPMs. We follow the approach used by Sofianos (1995), Menkveld (2013), and Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan (2014) and assume that for each sample stock and each day HFTs start and 
end the day with zero inventory, and that all inventory accumulated by the end of the day is sold at 
the closing midpoint. We compute HFT revenue for each stock and each day as: 
      ∑           
 
   
                                             
 
where      is the number of shares traded by HFTs during the  
th
 transaction,   is the indicator 
equal to 1 for buy trades and -1 for sell trades,    is the trade price,         is the inventory 
accumulated by HFTs before the end of the day, and    is the end of day midquote. Following 
Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014), we adjust transaction prices by the taker fee of 
$0.00295 and the maker rebate of $0.0028, although the results are robust to other levels of maker-
taker fees and to omitting the fees. The first term of Equation 4 represents cash flows to HFTs 
throughout the day, and the second term assigns a value to the end-of-day inventory. 
To assess the impact of EPMs on daily HFT revenues, we estimate the following panel 
regression for each stock   on day  : 
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where      captures the number of EPMs. The results are simple, and we report them here rather 
than in a separate table. The   estimate suggests than HFTs capture $3,834 in revenue per stock on 
an average day; whereas the   estimate indicates that the revenue becomes $219 greater with each 
EPM. As such, HFT activities during EPMs are potentially profitable. In addition to the general case 
in Equation 5, we compute the   estimates for all EPM breakdowns (i.e., permanent, transitory, 
standalone, co-EPMs, and for four magnitude quartiles). Due to the noisiness of profit calculations, 
the   estimates for the breakdowns are statistically insignificant. The revenue results should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. A conservative interpretation would suggest that there is no 
evidence of HFT losses on average due to EPMs and some evidence of profits. 
 
2.3.10. HFT activity and future EPMs 
Other research has suggested that HFTs trigger EPMs. Golub, Keane and Poon (2013) report 
that mini-crashes in individual stocks have increased in recent years and suggest a link between 
these crashes and HFT. Leal, Napoletano, Roventini and Fagiolo (2014) model a market in which 
HFTs play a fundamental role in generating flash crashes. To shed light on this issue, we use probit 
regressions to model the probability of an EPM as a function of lagged values of HFT
NET
, return, 
volume and spread: 
                          
                                           (6) 
 
where all variables are as previously defined and are lagged by one interval. 
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The results are in Table 2.8 and show no evidence of HFT being associated with a higher 
probability of future EPMs. On the contrary, HFT is associated with a lower EPM probability. For 
instance in column 1, the marginal effect of the HFT
NET
 variable implies that the probability of an 
EPM decreases by 0.6% of the unconditional probability with every standard deviation increase in 
the pre-EPM HFT
NET
. 
 
2.4. Robustness 
2.4.1. Alternative EPM identification techniques 
 Earlier, we discuss two alternative methods of EPM identification. The first method 
identifies EPMs as the 99.9
th
 percentile of raw returns, and the second method uses the Lee and 
Mykland (2012) methodology. In Table 2.9, we report a brief summary of results arising from these 
two methodologies. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the main sample. 
 
2.4.2. Alternative return distributions 
Figure 2.1 points to a significant intraday pattern in the number of EPMs, which is consistent 
with the well-known phenomenon whereby returns are large in the early morning and then level off. 
It therefore may be useful to check if conditioning the EPM definition on return distributions that 
are allowed to vary intraday affects our conclusions. Put differently, an early morning return may 
look extreme with respect to the afternoon returns, but unremarkable with respect to a distribution of 
price changes in the first half-hour of trading.  
To examine this issue, we split the sample into seven intervals: 9:35-10:00, 10:00-11:00, 
11:00-12:00, 12:00-13:00, 13:00-14:00, 14:00-15:00 and 15:00-15:55. We then define EPMs as the 
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99.9
th
 percentile of Equation 1 residuals in each interval. This approach produces a more even 
distribution of EPMs throughout the day than that in Figure 2.1. We then examine HFT behavior for 
these newly defined EPMs. The results are in Table 2.10 and support those obtained for the original 
sample; HFTs provide liquidity during an average EPM. We obtain similar results when we use two 
instead of seven intervals (i.e., 9:35-10:00 and 10:00-15:55).  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
We provide novel evidence on the stability of liquidity supply by high frequency traders 
(HFTs), a dominant subset of liquidity providers in modern markets. HFTs are endogenous liquidity 
providers (ELPs) and do not have the obligation to supply liquidity during stressful times. We show 
that HFTs are net suppliers of liquidity to non-HFTs (nHFTs) during extreme price movements 
(EPMs). HFTs supply liquidity even during the most extreme EPMs and the EPMs that result in 
permanent price changes.  
However, HFT liquidity supply is sensitive to multiple EPMs, as HFTs on average switch to 
demanding liquidity when multiple stocks simultaneously undergo EPMs and when EPMs persist 
throughout the day. The switch is due to the liquidity supplying strategies being more risk averse 
than the liquidity demanding strategies. During episodes of multiple simultaneous EPMs, position 
risk accumulated by HFTs is significantly higher than normal, likely leading to the reduction in their 
activity, particularly on the supply side. We find some evidence of HFTs’ earning positive revenues 
on days with EPMs. Despite this, the results show that HFTs do not appear to cause EPMs. 
While beyond the scope of this paper, more research can help generalize or qualify the 
findings. For instance, it will be important to know whether the practice of HFT evolved in a way 
whereby what was true in the late 2000s is no longer the case. Also, it is important to understand 
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how changes in market structure, such as the introduction of limit-up limit-down trading rules or the 
arrival of a new venue that provides protection to liquidity providers impacted ELPs. 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the sample of extreme price movements (EPMs) (Panel A) 
and for the full sample of 10-second intervals (Panel B).                 is the absolute value of 
the 10-second midpoint return.                    is the number of (HFT) trades during the 
interval.               and               are the total dollar and share volume traded during 
the interval.               and                 are quoted and relative quoted NBBO spreads, 
respectively in dollars and percentage points. All statistics are averaged over the 10-second 
sampling intervals. 
 
Panel A: Extreme price movements 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Absolute Return, % 0.478 0.436 0.188 
Total Trades 72.19 42.00 88.33 
Total HFT Trades 57.29 32.00 72.89 
Dollar Volume 462,950 166,929 998,832 
Share Volume 15,361 5,300 31,778 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.044 0.015 0.138 
Relative Spread, % 0.076 0.063 0.154 
N 45,200   
 
Panel B: Full sample 
Absolute Return, % 0.028 0.009 0.048 
Total Trades 18.1 11.0 18.7 
Total HFT Trades 15.8 10.0 15.4 
Dollar Volume 76,076 11,701 230,661 
Share Volume 1,987 292 6,045 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.026 0.010 0.057 
Relative Spread, % 0.046 0.041 0.032 
N 45.2 M   
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Table 2.2. Liquidity supply and demand around EPMs 
 
The table reports directional trading volume around extreme price movements (EPMs). Time 
interval t is the 10-second EPM interval. In addition, we report the results for the two time intervals 
preceding the EPM and two subsequent time intervals. HFT
D
 (nHFT
D
) is the difference in liquidity-
demanding HFT (nHFT) volume in the direction of the EPM and liquidity-demanding volume 
against the direction of the EPM. HFT
S
 (nHFT
S
) is the difference in liquidity-providing volume 
against the direction of the EPM and liquidity-providing volume in the direction of the EPM. 
HFT
NET
 (nHFT
NET
) is the difference between HFT
D
 and HFT
S
 (nHFT
D
 and nHFT
S
).  -values are in 
parentheses. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
 
t-20 t-10 t t+10 t+20 
HFT
NET
 -20.2 -73.9*** -242.7*** -112.8*** -33.7 
 
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
HFT
D
 -76.5*** -143.5*** 2296.3*** -273.6*** -63.1*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HFT
S
 56.3*** 69.6*** -2539.0*** 160.8*** 29.4 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
nHFT
NET
 20.2 73.9*** 242.7*** 112.8*** 33.7 
 
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
nHFT
D
 -64.6* -63.6 5369.0*** 613.6*** 296.0*** 
 
(0.05) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
nHFT
S
 84.8** 137.5*** -5126.4*** -500.8*** -262.3*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 2.3. Transitory and permanent EPMs 
 
The table reports summary statistics for transitory and permanent EPMs. Transitory EPMs revert by 
more than 2/3 of the EPM return in the following 30 minutes. Permanent EPMs do not revert by 
more than 1/3 in the same interval. Because we exclude EPMs that revert by the amount between 
1/3 and 2/3, the total number of EPMs in this table is 85.8% of that reported in Panel A of Table 1. 
Panel B reports HFT
NET
 around the two EPM types. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics
 
 transitory permanent 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Absolute Return, % 0.481 0.188 0.481 0.187 
Total Trades 70.90 87.79 69.78 85.64 
Total HFT Trades 55.97 71.35 55.54 71.90 
Dollar Volume 456,326 1,022,813 434,572 947,261 
Share Volume 14,576 29,516 14,470 29,250 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.047 0.147 0.046 0.140 
Relative Spr., % 0.079 0.144 0.080 0.157 
N 17,915  20,848  
 
 
Panel B: HFT
NET 
 
t-20 t-10 t t+10 t+20 
transitory -72.0** -144.2*** -363.0*** -121.6*** -92.5*** 
permanent 35.5 -3.0 -303.5*** -110.8*** 12.0 
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Table 2.4. EPM magnitude quartiles 
 
Panel A divides EPMs into quartiles by return magnitude, from smallest to largest. Panel B contains 
HFT
NET
 statistics. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics
 
 Q1 (small) Q2 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Absolute Return, % 0.385 0.094 0.415 0.102 
Total Trades 59.96 67.79 63.77 72.67 
Total HFT Trades 48.29 57.05 51.09 60.33 
Dollar Volume 365,702 764,091 390,139 819,044 
Share Volume 12,191 24,783 12,947 25,700 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.040 0.114 0.041 0.118 
Relative Spr., % 0.071 0.090 0.073 0.095 
N 11,280  11,320  
 Q3 Q4 (large) 
Absolute Return, % 0.465 0.116 0.645 0.261 
Total Trades 70.69 81.24 94.28 118.37 
Total HFT Trades 56.08 67.08 73.67 97.28 
Dollar Volume 455,307 977,999 640,282 1,316,028 
Share Volume 14,806 29,864 21,488 42,633 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.044 0.119 0.051 0.188 
Relative Spr., % 0.077 0.107 0.082 0.258 
N 11,280  11,320  
 
Panel B: HFT
NET 
 
t-20 t-10 t t+10 t+20 
Q1 -4.9 -106.2** -115.7** -102.2** -6.9 
Q2 -8.5 -90.3** -60.3 -108.4*** -7.1 
Q3 -70.9** -65.5 -248.7*** -89.8** -44.7 
Q4 3.4 -33.6 -545.5*** -150.6*** -76.0 
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Table 2.5. Standalone and co-EPMs 
 
Panel A divides EPMs into standalone and co-EPMs, with the latter group capturing EPMs that 
occur simultaneously in several stocks. Panel B contains HFT
NET
 statistics. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics
 
 standalone co-EPMs 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Absolute Return, % 0.487 0.198 0.471 0.181 
Total Trades 88.34 106.18 60.04 69.64 
Total HFT Trades 68.13 87.24 49.15 58.58 
Dollar Volume 611,337 1,237,578 351,352 753,084 
Share Volume 21,109 40,462 11,038 22,238 
Quoted Spread, $ 0.049 0.124 0.040 0.148 
Relative Spr., % 0.084 0.147 0.069 0.159 
# stocks   3.5 2.78 
N 19,402  25,798  
 
Panel B: HFT
NET 
 
t-20 t-10 t t+10 t+20 
standalone 25.5 -31.4 -1295.7*** -101.2** -37.1 
co-EPMs -54.5*** -105.8*** 549.3*** -121.5*** -31.1 
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Table 2.6. Standalone and Co-EPMs, EPM sequences 
 
The table reports HFT
NET
 for standalone and co-EPMs (Panel A) and for EPM sequences (Panel B). 
EPM sequences are strings of same-directional EPMs during the trading day, with column (4) 
identifying the position of a particular EPM in the sequence.  -values are in parentheses. Asterisks 
*** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
Panel A: Standalone and co-EPMs  Panel B: EPM sequences 
 HFT
NET
 # obs.   HFT
NET
 # obs. 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  1 -1,295*** 19,402  1
st
 -717*** 10,221 
  2 -55 7,326  2
nd
  -526*** 5,679 
  3  389*** 4,353  3
rd
  -419*** 3,931 
  4  542*** 2,980  4
th
  -315** 2,982 
  5  288*** 2,210  5
th
  -209 2,379 
  6  698*** 1,602  6
th
 -229 2,001 
  7  630*** 1,274  7
th
  316 1,710 
  8  973*** 888  8
th
 -21 1,483 
  9  1,411*** 891  9
th
  91 1,303 
  10  796*** 690  10
th
  69 1,145 
  11+  1,684*** 3,584  11
th
+   177*** 12,366 
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Table 2.7. Net HFT activity and EPMs  
 
The table reports estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
 
                                                              
 
where HFT
NET
 is the difference between HFT
D
 and HFT
S
; the dummy 1EPM is equal to one if a 10-second 
interval t is identified to contain an EPM and is equal to zero otherwise; 1EPM-TRANSITORY and 1EPM-PERMANENT 
are dummies that capture the two EPM types; 1EPM-STANDALONE captures the standalone EPMs; 1CO-EPM 
captures EPMs that occur simultaneously in two or more sample stocks; 1EPM-Q1 through 1EPM-Q4 identify four 
EPM quartiles by magnitude, from the smallest to the largest; Ret is the absolute return; Vol is the total 
trading volume; Spr is the percentage quoted spread; and           is a vector of   lags of the dependent 
variable and each of the independent variables, with              and the variables indexed with a 
subscript  . All non-dummy variables are standardized on the stock level. Regressions are estimated with 
stock fixed effects.  -Values associated with the double-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** and 
** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1EPM -0.798***    
 (0.00)    
1EPM-TRANSITORY  -0.783***   
  (0.00)   
1EPM-PERMANENT  -0.816***   
  (0.00)   
1EPM-STANDALONE   -1.437***  
   (0.00)  
1CO-EPM   -0.305***  
   (0.00)  
1EPM-Q1    -0.487*** 
    (0.00) 
1EPM-Q2    -0.561*** 
    (0.00) 
1EPM-Q3    -0.799*** 
    (0.00) 
1EPM-Q4    -1.397*** 
    (0.00) 
Ret 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vol 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spr -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 2.8. EPM determinants 
 
The table reports the coefficients and the marginal effects from a probit model of EPM occurrence: 
 
                          
                                       
 
where the dependent variable is equal to one if an interval   contains an extreme price movement and zero 
otherwise. All independent variables are lagged by one interval. HFT
NET
 is the share volume traded in the 
direction of the price movement minus the share volume traded against the direction of the price movement 
for all HFT trades,     is the absolute return,     is total traded volume,     is the percentage quoted 
spread. All variables are standardized on the stock level. The marginal effects are scaled by a factor of 1,000. 
 -Values are in parentheses. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
 
 All Standalone Co-EPMs Permanent Transitory 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -3.237*** -3.446*** -3.382*** -3.430*** -3.469*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HFT
NET
t-1 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** 
Marginal Effect -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 
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Table 2.9. EPMs defined using alternative methodologies 
 
Panel A reports HFT
NET 
for the sample of EPMs defined using the 99.9
th
 percentile of raw returns. 
Panel B reports HFT
NET 
for the sample defined using the Lee and Mykland (2012) methodology. 
 
Panel A: 99
th
 percentile of raw returns
 
 HFT
NET 
all -299.3*** 
transitory -457.6*** 
permanent -323.2*** 
Q1 -110.8* 
Q2 -145.5*** 
Q3 -293.7*** 
Q4 -655.5*** 
standalone -1296.9*** 
co-EPMs   446.4*** 
 
Panel B: Lee-Mykland (2012) 
 HFT
NET 
all -892.6*** 
transitory -973.2*** 
permanent -1063.9*** 
Q1 -648.8*** 
Q2 -748.6*** 
Q3 -859.2*** 
Q4 -1312.5*** 
standalone -1811.9*** 
co-EPMs   850.7*** 
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Table 2.10. EPMs defined intraday  
 
The table examines HFT behavior around EPMs defined for different time-of-the-day distributional 
cutoffs. First, we split the day into the following seven intervals: 9:35-10:00, 10:00-11:00, 11:00-
12:00, 12:00-13:00, 13:00-14:00, 14:00-15:00 and 15:00-15:55. For each interval, we select returns 
above the 99.9
th
 percentile. This definition allows EPMs to be evenly distributed within an average 
day. For the newly defined EPMs, we report the average HFT
NET 
statistics as in the previous tables. 
We also report the statistics for the 9:35-10:00 and 10:00-15:55 intervals. Asterisks *** and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
 
t-20 t-10 t t+10 t+20 
Seven intervals 9.9 47.3** -267.3*** -130.6*** -61.2*** 
      
9:35-10:00 -20.1 114.4 -607.4*** -236.3** -98.3 
10:00-15:55 12.1 42.6** -243.4*** -123.0*** -59.0*** 
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Figure 2.1. Intraday distribution of EPMs  
 
The figure contains a minute-by-minute intraday distribution of EPMs. The scale of the vertical axis 
is logarithmic. 
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Figure 2.2. Daily distribution of EPMs 
 
The figure contains the daily distribution of sample EPMs identified during the 2008-2009 period. 
The scale of the vertical axis is logarithmic. 
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Figure 2.3. HFT and nHFT activity around EPMs 
 
The figure displays the average return path and trading activity around the sample EPMs. HFT
D
 
(nHFT
D
) is liquidity demanded by HFTs (nHFTs) in the direction of the EPM (in # shares) minus 
liquidity demanded against the direction of the EPM. HFT
NET
 is the net effect of HFT liquidity 
demand and supply. CRET is the cumulative return. The figure includes both positive and negative 
EPMs, and for exposition purposes we invert the statistics for the latter. 
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Figure 2.4. EPM types, an illustration 
 
The figure describes two EPM types according to the associated price patterns: (a) a transitory EPM 
that reverses after a period of time and (b) a permanent EPM that does not reverse.  
  
(a) transitory 
price
(b) permanent 
price
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Figure 2.5. HFT
D 
and HFT
S
 during co-EPMs 
The figure reports per stock HFTD and HFTS during the standalone EPMs and co-EPMs. 
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Figure 2.6. QVaR 
The figure reports the quasi-value at risk (QVaR) accumulated by HFTs during 0, 1, 2, … and 10+ 
simultaneous EPMs. We begin by estimating the 99
th
 percentile of the 10-second absolute return of 
the portfolio of sample stocks. Then, we estimate average returns for each stock  ,     
    , during 
the instances of portfolio tail returns. The contribution of individual stocks to the portfolio tail 
returns varies slowly. With this in mind, we use the previous day’s composition of portfolio tail 
returns as a proxy for the expected composition on day  . We then compute intraday QVaR as 
follows: 
 
          (∑       
           
 
 
 ∑        
           
 
 
)  
 
where       is the dollar inventory in stock   accumulated by HFTs during the interval   valued at 
the last midquote of the interval. 
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Figure 2.7. HFT and nHFT activity during EPMs, a second by second view 
 
The figure displays the average second by second price path and trading activity during [-10; +10]-
second windows centered on the largest one-second EPM return. HFT
D
 (nHFT
D
) is liquidity 
demanded by HFTs (nHFTs) in the direction of the EPM (in # shares) minus liquidity demanded 
against the direction of the EPM. HFT
NET
 is the net effect of HFT liquidity demand and supply. 
CRET is the cumulative return. The figure includes both positive and negative EPMs, and for 
exposition purposes we invert the statistics for the latter. 
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Chapter 3. EVERY CLOUD HAS A SILVER LINING: FAST TRADING, 
MICROWAVE CONNECTIVITY AND TRADING COSTS 
3.1. Introduction 
Competition on relative speed is a defining characteristic of modern markets, where trading 
firms spend generously to gain sub-second speed advantages over their rivals. Speed-improving 
technology is expensive and sometimes only available to a select few, leading to speed differentials. 
A rich theory literature suggests two possible effects of such differentials on liquidity.
15
 On the one 
hand, being faster may allow liquidity providers to avoid adverse selection and to manage inventory 
more efficiently. As a result, liquidity may improve. Alternatively, the differentials may allow some 
traders to pick off stale limit orders, impairing liquidity. To shed new light on these possibilities, we 
examine a multi-year time series of exogenous shocks to speed differentials. The results show that 
when the differentials exist liquidity is impaired.  
We examine information transmission between financial markets in Chicago and New York, 
where signals are sent via two channels: a fiber-optic cable and several microwave networks. 
Microwave networks are about 30% faster than cable, and have two important characteristics. First, 
in 2011-2012 (the first two years of our four-year sample period) they are only accessible by a select 
group of traders. Second, precipitation (i.e., rain and snow) disrupts them. The first characteristic 
creates a two-tiered market, where some traders are faster than others. The second characteristic 
intermittently eliminates the speed advantage of the fastest tier. We show that when the microwave 
networks are functional, the speed advantage is used primarily to pick off stale limit orders in the 
course of latency arbitrage. When precipitation eliminates the speed advantage adverse selection 
and trading costs decline by more than 7%, while volatility declines by about 6%. 
                                                          
15
 See Hoffmann (2014), Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2015), Foucault, Hombert and Roşu (2016), Foucault, Kozhan and 
Tham (2016), Menkveld and Zoican (2016), Aït-Sahalia and Saǧlam (2017). 
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The liquidity improvements have two explanations. The first is mechanical: when the 
microwave users lose speed advantage they stop picking off standing limit orders, and the remaining 
liquidity takers receive better executions. The second explanation allows for improvements in 
liquidity supply, whereby limit orders are priced more aggressively when adverse selection is low. 
The data support both explanations. First, both trade price impacts and trading volume decline, and 
second, realized spreads decline and limit order aggressiveness increases during microwave 
disruptions. 
On balance, the results suggest that microwave users prefer to take liquidity rather than 
supply it. Many theory models recognize this preference, yet some empirical studies find that fast 
traders often trade via limit orders.
16
 There are two possible explanations for liquidity taking in our 
setting. First, the execution probability of limit orders is relatively low, especially for the short-lived 
latency arbitrage opportunities. Second, in many liquid stocks spreads are narrow and order queues 
are long, further reducing execution chances. Corroborating the latter explanation, the largest 
reductions in adverse selection during microwave disruptions occur in assets with narrow spreads. 
In addition to posting new orders, speed advantages should allow traders to timely cancel 
stale limit orders. The data however suggest that an average limit order trader does not possess such 
advantages, likely because the microwave connections are available only to a select few in 2011-
2012. Notably, the status quo changes in winter of 2012-2013, when a technology provider McKay 
Brothers democratizes microwave transmissions. Instead of selling microwave bandwidth that 
traders use to outpace others, the firm begins to use its network to transmit the latest price updates 
and sell them to anyone on a subscription basis. As a result, the speed advantages previously 
enjoyed by select firms are diminished. We find that once information transmission is democratized 
                                                          
16
 See for instance, O’Hara (2015), Yao and Ye (2015), Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2016), Chordia, Green and 
Kottimukkalur (2016). 
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in this manner precipitation stops having an effect on trading costs, suggesting an elimination of the 
speed differential between an average liquidity taker and an average supplier. Furthermore, 
democratization leads to a one-time reduction in adverse selection and trading costs. 
Our results point to a negative relation between speed differentials and liquidity. As such, 
they provide a complementary perspective to that of Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordén and Riordan 
(2015), who show that in the Swedish market speed differentials resulting from colocation are 
mainly sought by market makers and therefore benefit liquidity. The authors suggest that although 
colocation is most attractive to market makers, technology that increases information transmission 
speeds between markets may be sought by other traders, such as latency arbitragers, leading to 
negative liquidity effects. Our study also corroborates the findings of Baron, Brogaard, Hagströmer 
and Kirilenko (2016) and Foucault, Kozhan and Tham (2016), who suggest that modern arbitragers 
often use marketable orders, thus increasing order flow toxicity and impairing liquidity.  
Although the financial economics literature has previously explored the effects of weather 
on trader behavior, these effects have been mainly ascribed to investor mood. Although we examine 
a different weather-induced regularity, a technological one, it is important that we address the 
possibility that our results come from slower information processing attributed to weather-induced 
moods of traders in Chicago and New York (deHaan, Madsen and Piotroski, 2015). To do so, we 
show that our results are robust to focusing exclusively on precipitation in Ohio, a state that hosts all 
microwave network paths yet has a relatively low concentration of financial firms. We also confirm 
the robustness of the results to various sample selection procedures and to alternative precipitation 
variables. 
Our contribution to the literature is as follows. First, we shed new light on the predictions of 
theory models that examine speed differentials and provide empirical evidence on the models’ 
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insights into (i) order choices of the fastest traders and (ii) the liquidity suppliers’ response to lower 
adverse selection risk. Second, we offer evidence complementary to existing empirical research that 
examines the relation between speed differentials and liquidity. Some market participants claim that 
faster markets are unconditionally better; our results suggest that the benefits are conditional on how 
speed advancements are used. Finally, we describe a new approach to measuring exogenous 
variation in relative speed in modern markets that, to our knowledge, has not been previously 
examined.
17
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the history and physics of 
information transmission, the state of the trading speed literature, and latency arbitrage between the 
futures and equity markets. Section 3 describes the data and sample. Section 4 discusses the main 
empirical tests. Section 5 reports robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Institutional background and related literature 
3.2.1. History and physics of information transmission between Chicago and New York 
In the world of ultra-fast trading, the physics of signal transmission plays an important role. 
The most common way to transmit information over long distances is via a fiber-optic cable. The 
first such cable between Chicago and New York was laid in the mid-1980s; however, its path was 
not optimal for ultra-fast communications. The cable was placed along the existing rail lines, 
making multiple detours from a straight line, going south to Pittsburgh and thereby exceeding the 
straight-line distance between Chicago and New York by about 300 miles. Realizing potential 
latency reduction from a more linear setup, a technology company Spread Networks laid another 
                                                          
17
 Koudijs (2015, 2016) uses adverse weather events to study information transmission between London and 
Amsterdam in the 18
th
 century. 
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cable in 2010. The new cable had significantly fewer detours, went through the Appalachian 
Mountains and shaved valuable milliseconds off the signal transmission time. 
Although fiber is a very fast transmission medium, it is not the fastest. Because microwaves 
travel faster through air than photons do through fiber, a network of microwave towers placed in a 
straight line can shave additional milliseconds off the signal transmission time. At the time of this 
study, microwave networks advertise round-trip information transmission speeds that are about 30% 
faster than their fiber-optic competitors. Specifically, during the sample period, microwave 
networks transmit information from Chicago to New York in about 4.5 ms, whereas fiber 
transmission takes about 6.5 ms. 
Although faster than cable, microwaves have a disadvantage – they are relatively easily 
disrupted. Among the disruptors are rain droplets and snowflakes, especially when rainfall/snowfall 
is substantial. During such disruptions, traders who use microwave links lose their speed advantage 
and must either stop trading or transition from microwave to fiber transmissions. Industry insiders 
suggest that mainly the former happens; certain strategies are switched off when firms realize that 
their speed advantage is temporarily lost. The switch is automatic and does not require human 
involvement. 
The first microwave network that linked Chicago and New York was operational at the end 
of 2010, with several additional networks built in 2011 and 2012. During this period, access to 
microwave transmission speeds was limited to a small group of trading firms, because the Federal 
Communications Commission restricted the number of network licenses citing airwave congestion. 
As such, the 2011-2012 period provides us with a unique opportunity to examine a two-tiered 
marketplace where some traders have access to the fastest speeds and others do not. Our results 
linking precipitation episodes to lower adverse selection and trading costs come from this period. 
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3.2.2. Information transmission speed and market quality 
The speed-related effects have been extensively modeled in recent literature; Menkveld 
(2016) provides a comprehensive review. Bernales (2014), Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2015), 
Foucault, Hombert and Roşu (2016) and Foucault, Kozhan and Tham (2016) model a market where 
speed differentials result in fast traders’ generating adverse selection for slower limit order traders. 
Limit order traders in turn seek higher compensation for providing liquidity, thereby increasing 
liquidity costs for all market participants. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) and Menkveld and 
Zoican (2016) show that, even in absence of speed differentials between the fast traders, sequential 
order processing and increases in exchange engine speeds lead to adverse selection of liquidity 
providers, increasing transaction costs. 
Hoffmann (2014) and Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015) show that when some market makers 
become fast they avoid being adversely selected and increase liquidity supply. In Hoffmann (2014) 
however, slower market makers become more exposed to adverse selection and widen their quotes. 
Depending on the relative size and competitiveness of the two groups, speeding up of select market 
makers may have both positive and negative consequences. Bongaerts, Kong and Van Achter 
(2016) show that both liquidity takers and liquidity makers will engage in speed competition. Roşu 
(2015) and Du and Zhu (2016) suggest that when some traders are faster than others, volatility may 
increase. 
 
3.2.3. Information flow between futures and equities 
We focus on information transmission between Chicago and New York. In the U.S., most 
futures contracts trade on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), particularly in its data center in 
Aurora, IL. Meanwhile, equities mainly trade at data centers that are located in New Jersey, close to 
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New York City. During our sample period, the NYSE data center is in Mahwah, NJ; Nasdaq data 
center is in Carteret, NJ; BATS is in Weehawken, NJ; and Direct Edge is in Secaucus, NJ. To 
continue with academic tradition, throughout the paper we refer to the two locales as Chicago and 
New York. 
Information transmission between the two market centers is driven by fast arbitrageurs. Our 
data show that when microwave technology allows these arbitrageurs to speed up, both price 
impacts and trading costs increase. This result may appear counterintuitive because arbitrageurs are 
often viewed as liquidity providers who enhance market efficiency. Several theory models suggest 
that arbitrageurs may respond to supply and demand shocks faster and more effectively than 
traditional market makers thereby improving liquidity (Holden, 1995; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, 
2010). Guided by the insights of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), these models assume that 
arbitrageurs are passive and provide liquidity when it is required by noise traders. 
Recent theory relaxes this assumption and allows arbitrageurs to demand liquidity when it is 
profitable. Foucault, Kozhan and Tham (2016) model a market in which arbitrageurs are faster than 
market makers. When arbitrageurs trade to enforce the law of one price, they often expose market 
makers to adverse selection risk. As in Copeland and Galai (1983), market makers require 
compensation for the risk of being adversely selected, and liquidity becomes more expensive. 
Foucault, Kozhan and Tham (2016) conclude that although arbitrage makes prices more efficient, it 
may hurt liquidity. This conclusion echoes the result in Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam (2007), 
who find that arbitrage opportunities Granger-cause illiquidity. 
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3.3. Data and sample 
 Our main analysis is based on the millisecond DTAQ data. The sample period spans four 
years, from January 2011 through December 2014. The first two years (2011-2012) are 
characterised by limited access to microwave technology. The latter period (2013-2014) captures 
the time after the technology was democratized. 
 To achieve the fastest speeds, microwave networks follow paths that are as straight as 
possible and therefore rather similar. For illustration, Figure 3.1 reports tower locations of three 
select networks connecting Chicago to the New York data centers. The data on tower locations are 
obtained from the Federal Communications Commission (https://www.fcc.gov). Going east from 
the CME data center, the networks pass through Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, western Pennsylvania and 
then split in eastern Pennsylvania, with the southern branches going to Nasdaq’s data center in 
Carteret and the northern branches going to the NYSE in Mahwah. To avoid clutter, Figure 3.1 
maps three microwave networks; FCC data show that all networks follow similar paths. 
 
3.3.1. Precipitation data 
We obtain precipitation data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(http://www.noaa.gov). The data contain precipitation statistics collected by weather stations across 
the U.S., in 15-minute intervals. The data also contain precise station locations. The stations report 
in local time, so for stations in Illinois and northwestern Indiana located in the Central time zone we 
add one hour to report times to match DTAQ time stamps. A standard piece of equipment at every 
station is a precipitation tank equipped with an automatic gauge that measures accumulated 
89 
 
precipitation. We focus on data collected by 83 stations located along the Chicago-New York 
corridor (Figure 3.2). In the robustness section, we examine station samples of different sizes. 
We note that although it may only rain over Indiana or Ohio, the entire microwave network 
will be disrupted. A relatively narrow weather front like the one in Figure 3.3 will result in weather 
stations located within the front reporting high levels of precipitation. In the meantime, stations 
located outside the front will report no precipitation. To capture relatively narrow bands of intense 
precipitation, our main independent variable        is computed as the sum of precipitation 
amounts reported by all stations. We examine alternative specifications in the robustness section. 
Statistics reported in Panel A of Table 3.1 indicate that an average 15-minute sampling 
interval sees 0.155 mm of precipitation. The distribution is rather skewed, with a median of 0.07, 
indicating that periods of low precipitation are occasionally interrupted by significant rain or snow. 
We note that microwave networks are only disrupted when precipitation is substantial. We therefore 
focus on high levels of precipitation and compute two additional metrics,         and        , 
that capture intervals when precipitation is 0.5 and 1 standard deviations above the mean. The two 
groups contain, respectively, 17% and 10.5% of all intervals, and         and         events 
last on average 54 and 49 minutes. As such, significant precipitation is observed rather frequently 
but ends quickly, forming a time series with sufficient variability. 
 
3.3.2 Asset samples 
The importance of information flows between the futures markets in Chicago and the equity 
markets in New York is well recognized in the literature. Some studies find that futures markets 
lead price discovery (Kawaller, Koch, and Koch, 1987; Chan, 1992). Others suggest that 
information may flow both ways (Chan, Chan and Karolyi, 1991; Roll, Schwartz and 
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Subrahmanyam, 2007). Hasbrouck (2003) shows that the direction of information flow depends on 
the futures trading activity; for the most active contracts, futures dominate price discovery. Given 
that the most active futures contracts track baskets of securities, our focus in the equity market is on 
the ETFs. As long as price discovery via futures is non-trivial, the speed of information transmission 
between Chicago and New York should matter for trading costs in ETFs. In a later section, we 
examine the direction of price discovery between the two markets in more detail. 
We use millisecond DTAQ data for a sample of 100 most actively traded ETFs. Among 
these, 50 ETFs track U.S. equity indexes; 22 – international indexes; 20 – corporate or treasury 
interest rate indexes; 4 – metals (i.e., gold and silver); 1 – a real estate portfolio; and 3 – other assets 
(Panel B of Table 3.1). Many ETFs in our sample track the same baskets of securities as the CME 
futures contracts (e.g., the QQQ ETF and the E-mini Nasdaq-100 futures). Others track baskets 
similar to those of major CME contracts. For example, the iShares Russell 1000 ETF does not have 
a corresponding CME futures contract; however, a portion of price discovery in this ETF comes 
from futures on other indexes such as the S&P 500.
18
 
 
3.3.3. DTAQ data and summary statistics 
Following Holden and Jacobsen (2014), we combine the DTAQ NBBO and Quote files to 
obtain the complete NBBO record and merge the resulting dataset with the Trade file. We sign 
trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm and exclude the first and the last five minutes of 
each trading day to avoid the influence of the opening and closing procedures. Panel A of Table 3.2 
reports market activity statistics. Precipitation data are in 15-minute intervals, and we aggregate the 
statistics accordingly. An average ETF has 5,305 NBBO updates every 15 minutes, equivalent to 
                                                          
18
 The CME delisted E-mini Russell 1000 futures contract in 2007 and relisted it in 2015. 
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about 6 updates per second. In addition, this ETF trades 500 times every 15 minutes, for a total 
volume of 190,522 shares.  
 
3.3.4. Precipitation and information transmission speed 
Our empirical tests are based on the premise that precipitation disrupts microwave networks 
and slows down the fastest traders. In Figure 3.4, we illustrate such disruptions. The figure reports 
the number of equity trades that follow a futures trade when precipitation is zero or very low 
(       <0, orange bars), and when it is high (       >1, blue bars). The number of trades is 
standardized for each asset to allow for cross-sectional comparability. To reduce serial correlation 
effects, we focus on the standalone futures trades, those not preceded by another futures or equity 
trade in the previous 100 milliseconds. Futures trades come from a 2012 CME dataset that contains 
four E-mini contracts: S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, Nasdaq 100 and Financial Sector Select. 
Intraday data for these contracts are sold by the CME as a bundle. ETF trades are from DTAQ. 
Figure 3.4 shows that when precipitation is low, trading activity in the equity market picks 
up 5 ms after a futures trade. Meanwhile, when precipitation is heavy, equity trading begins 7 ms 
after a futures trade. During the sample period, microwave networks transmit information from 
Chicago to New York in about 4.5 ms, whereas fiber transmission takes about 6.5 ms. As such, the 
results corroborate the notion that precipitation slows traders by the 2-ms difference between the 
microwave and fiber speeds. 
Until mid-2015, U.S. exchanges are not required to synchronize their clocks (Bartlett and 
McCrary, 2016). During our sample period, the CME clock lags DTAQ by about one millisecond, 
and we adjust for this lag. Without the adjustment, it appears that equity trading during periods of 
zero precipitation picks up 4 ms after a futures trade, which is not possible as it would require 
92 
 
microwave speed to be equal to or faster than the speed of light. Importantly, the adjustment does 
not affect the evidence of the 2-ms speed advantage of the fastest traders. This is because the 
adjustment affects both       2<0 and        >1 equally, and therefore the difference between 
them remains the same.  
 
3.3.5. Picking-off risk 
Recent literature suggests that fast informed traders often trade via limit orders. Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan (2016) show that limit orders submitted by fast traders play a significant 
role in price discovery. O’Hara (2015) also suggests that fast informed traders often prefer limit to 
marketable orders. Both studies however point out that most traders do not resort to one order type 
exclusively, but rather use them interchangeably depending on the circumstances.  
One of such circumstances is the constraint introduced by the minimum tick size. A binding 
tick size provides a strong incentive for fast traders to use marketable orders. Assume that a fast 
trader learns that an asset is underpriced. She wants to buy, but if the tick size is binding she cannot 
raise the outstanding bid without locking or crossing the market. Given these considerations, and if 
her signal is sufficiently strong, she may choose to consume liquidity (pick off the outstanding ask 
quote) despite having to pay the spread. As such, picking-off risk may be higher in assets with 
binding tick sizes. 
The very active ETFs in our sample are quite liquid and therefore are likely to be constrained 
by the minimum tick size. Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that the average NBBO is 1.9 cents, with a 
median of 1.2 cents. Given these constraints, trade-related price discovery and the associated 
picking-off risk may be important. In subsequent tests, we subdivide assets into two categories: 
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most and least constrained. To do so, we divide the assets into terciles according to the average 
NBBO. An average (median) NBBO in the first tercile is 1.0 (1.0) cent, whereas it is 3.6 (1.8) cents 
in the third tercile. We define the first tercile as the most tick constrained and the third tercile as the 
least constrained. 
To further examine the issue of picking-off risk, we compute two metrics. First, we estimate 
a share of price discovery attributable to trades. Second, we compute trade price impacts. The 
former metric follows Hasbrouck’s (1991 a,b) and decomposes the efficient price variance into the 
trade-related and trade-unrelated components. The details of this calculation are in the Appendix. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that the trade-related component is 29.6%. As such, new information is 
incorporated into prices through trades rather frequently, and therefore concerns with the picking-
off risk are warranted. 
Our second proxy for the picking-off risk is the conventional price impact metric, computed 
on a round-trip basis as twice the signed difference between the midquote at a time after the trade 
and the midquote at the time of the trade:           (           ), where    is the Lee and 
Ready (1991) trade direction indicator,      is the midquote computed as 
                      ⁄ , and   indicates the time elapsed since the trade. Recent research 
uses  s of just a few seconds. For instance, O’Hara (2015) suggests that 5- to 15-second intervals 
may be the most useful, whereas Conrad, Wahal and Xiang (2015) use price impacts up to 20 
seconds. 
To check if intervals of these lengths are practical in our setting, Figure 3.5 traces price 
impacts for 60 seconds after a trade. The results clarify our understanding of price dynamics on two 
levels. First, the data show that price impacts are greater than zero, corroborating the earlier 
assertion that non-trivial amounts of information are incorporated into prices through trades. 
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Second, although a significant proportion of information is incorporated into quotes within a second 
after the trade, incorporation continues at a slower pace up to 60 seconds. In the remainder of the 
tests, we focus on 15-second intervals, with robustness checks examining intervals between 1 and 
60 seconds. 
It may not be immediately obvious that there is enough adverse selection in ETFs to warrant 
non-zero price impacts. We suggest that as long as sufficient amounts of macro information are 
present, price impacts in ETFs may be quite sizeable. In a study that examines a recent sample of 
large U.S. equities, Chakrabarty, Jain, Shkilko and Sokolov (2016) report price impacts that are 
35% of the effective spread. In Table 3.2, the ETF price impacts are 31% of the effective spread. As 
such, adverse selection is a non-trivial component of ETF trading costs and is comparable to the 
levels found in equities. 
 
3.3.6. Trading costs and liquidity provider revenues 
Table 3.2 also reports liquidity costs and liquidity provider revenues proxied by effective 
spreads,     , and realized spreads,     .     is computed as twice the signed difference between 
the prevailing midquote and the trade price,   :                  .      is computed as the 
difference between the effective spread and the price impact. We volume-weight effective and 
realized spreads. The average (median) effective spread is 1.9 (1.0) cents and the average (median) 
realized spread is 1.3 (0.7) cents.  
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3.4. Empirical findings 
3.4.1. Connectivity disruptions and picking-off risk 
When the microwave networks are fully functional, their users have a speed advantage. 
Theory models make several assumptions as to how this advantage may be used. Some models 
assume that the fastest traders can better manage adverse selection risk. Others suggest that speed 
advantages are used to generate such risk by picking off slower traders. In this section, we aim to 
better understand which of these assumptions prevails. 
If speed advantages allow fast traders to pick off outstanding limit orders, connectivity 
disruptions should result in lower price impacts. Alternatively, if fast connections are used to 
incorporate the latest information into quotes, the disruptions may be accompanied by larger price 
impacts. Certainly, it is possible that both explanations have merit, and our data allow us to gauge 
which of them prevails. We focus on the 2011-2012 period when the microwave networks allowed 
for speed differentials among traders. The post-democratization period (2013-2014) is examined in 
a later section. Chung and Chuwonganant (2014) and Malinova, Park and Riordan (2014) argue that 
VIX is a first-order determinant of trading activity and liquidity, and we use their insight in a 
regression setup as follows: 
                                ,                          (1) 
where        is the price impact;        is total precipitation in the Chicago-New York 
corridor; and     is the intraday volatility index proxied by the iPath S&P500 VIX ST Futures ETF 
that tracks VIX. As discussed earlier, we also use         and         to identify the most 
significant precipitation events. All asset-specific variables are standardized (by demeaning and 
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scaling by the standard deviation for each stock), so regression models control for asset fixed 
effects. Additionally, the standard errors are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. 
Table 3.3 shows that price impacts decline during network disruptions. Significant amounts 
of precipitation captured by         are associated with a 0.047 standard deviations, or 7.1%, 
decline in price impacts (Panel A). It therefore appears that microwave users prefer marketable 
orders to limit orders. 
 Per our earlier suggestion, marketable orders may be the only choice when the tick size is 
binding. If this is so, microwave network disruptions will have a larger effect on price impacts in the 
most constrained assets. The results in Panel B are consistent with this expectation. Price impacts in 
the most constrained ETFs decline by 0.051 standard deviations, whereas they decline by only 0.039 
standard deviations in the least constrained ETFs. It therefore appears that fast traders use more 
limit orders when the tick size allows. This said, even in the least constrained ETFs liquidity taking 
is preferred by microwave users as evident from the decline in price impacts.  
 
3.4.2. Trading costs and liquidity provider revenues 
To the extent that liquidity providers use speed advantages to avoid being adversely selected, 
microwave connectivity disruptions should cause them to widen spreads. If however speed 
advantages are used mainly to pick off standing orders, precipitation should result in reduced 
adverse selection, and spreads may narrow. The tests discussed earlier provide support to the 
picking-off story, so we expect trading costs to decline during precipitation episodes. We however 
note that it is not clear how quickly liquidity providers adjust to lower adverse selection, and if they 
adjust at all given that precipitation episodes are relatively short. Easley and O’Hara (1992) describe 
price adjustment as gradual learning. In their model, market makers do not immediately know if 
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informed traders are active, but learn over time. Whether such learning happens in our setting is an 
empirical question. 
In Table 3.3, we report eq. 1 coefficient estimates for effective and realized spreads. 
Effective spreads decline by 0.043 standard deviations, or 7.2%, during heavy precipitation episodes 
(        in Panel A). Expectedly, this result is more pronounced for the least constrained assets 
(Panel B), where the spreads have room to decline. The results are consistent with predictions of the 
models that emphasize the picking-off risk and are also informative about the speed of adjustment to 
changing levels of adverse selection. Specifically, the length of an average precipitation episode 
appears sufficient for liquidity providers to adjust. It is however unclear if this adjustment reflects 
an equilibrium. In a later section, we report results based on an exogenous shock that resulted in the 
long-term reduction in speed differentials. This shock further improves our understanding of the 
equilibrium effects. 
We note that there is an alternative, mechanical, explanation to the decline in effective 
spreads. Aggressively priced limit orders may be added to the book equally often when the 
microwaves are up and when they are down. Since such orders are consumed less when the 
arbitrage strategies are switched off, they are more readily available to the remaining liquidity 
takers, who obtain better prices. In a later section, we examine trades and limit order book data to 
show that both explanations have merit. 
Realized spreads also decline, by 0.021 standard deviations, or 5.3%, during         
events. As such, network disruptions not only reduce liquidity costs, but also reduce liquidity 
provider revenues. Similarly to the effective spread result, there are two possible explanations. On 
the one hand, liquidity supply may become more competitive when picking-off risk is reduced. 
Chakrabarty, Jain, Shkilko and Sokolov (2016) show that when the adverse selection risk declines, 
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liquidity providers reposition orders from the deeper layers of the book to the inside. On the other 
hand, the effect may be mechanical. When microwaves allow latency arbitrageurs to pick off inside 
quotes, the spread increases by at least one tick. Given the coarseness of this change, the resulting 
realized spreads may be unduly large. 
 
3.4.3. Trading activity and volatility 
The literature often assumes that lower trading costs attract additional trading interest and 
therefore result in higher trading volume. In our setting, this assumption will not necessarily hold. 
This is because aside from lower costs, network disruptions lead to a reduction in the number of 
picking-off opportunities and consequently the volume generated by latency arbitrage. The 
regression results in Panel A of Table 3.4 are consistent with this notion. The number of trades 
declines by 0.072 standard deviations during         events. Trading volume also declines; by 
0.042 standard deviations. 
The finance literature has not yet come to a consensus on the relation between electronic 
trading and volatility. While some studies report that the relation is negative (Hasbrouck and Saar, 
2013; Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014), others find it to be positive (Boehmer, Fong and 
Wu, 2015). Closest to our setting, a theory model by Roşu (2015) suggests that as fast traders pick 
off market makers’ quotes, volatility may increase. Du and Zhu (2016) also show that when some 
traders are faster than others, liquidity shocks result in greater volatility. Our results are consistent 
with these insights; volatility, which we define as the difference between the high and low prices 
during an interval scaled by the average price, declines by 0.118 standard deviations, or 5.8%, 
during         events. 
In assets with wider spreads new information may be incorporated into prices through both 
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marketable and aggressive limit orders. Meanwhile, in assets whose spreads are constrained by the 
minimum tick size, fast traders must rely on marketable orders. Naturally, these considerations 
should affect changes in trading activity during network disruptions. Panel B shows that the number 
of trades and trading volume decline in the most constrained assets, yet remain unchanged in the 
least constrained assets. These results corroborate two of our earlier conjectures: (i) fast traders use 
fewer marketable orders in the least constrained ETFs, and (ii) trading volume may increase in 
response to lower trading costs compensating for some of the volume lost when the arbitrage 
strategies are switched off. 
Overall, the results suggest that even though lower spreads may attract additional trading 
interest, trading volume generated by this interest is smaller or equal to the lost arbitrage volume. 
One possibility is that the disruptions are not long enough or not sufficiently predictable for 
additional trading interest to emerge. A trading strategy that is highly sensitive to transaction costs 
may not be viable in a high cost environment, even if high cost periods are occasionally interrupted 
by low cost periods. This said, an extended period of lower spreads may make the strategy viable, 
thus generating new trading interest. In a later section, we examine this possibility by studying an 
event that resulted in a long-lasting loss of speed advantage by the network users. 
 
3.4.4. Limit order aggressiveness 
 Earlier, we suggested that the reduction in trading costs may have two explanations: (i) the 
mechanical one, whereby standing orders are not picked off as frequently during microwave 
disruptions and (ii) the one based on the emergence of latent liquidity. The results in the previous 
section corroborate the first explanation. In this section, we use ITCH limit order book data 
provided by Nasdaq to examine the second explanation. 
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 Specifically, we ask if the proportion of aggressively priced limit orders increases during 
microwave disruptions. We compute two metrics: the number of orders that (i) match the prevailing 
NBBO and (ii) the number of orders that match or improve the NBBO. We scale both metrics by the 
number of total order submissions. Eq. 1 coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.5 confirm that the 
number of aggressively priced limit orders increases during precipitation episodes. For orders that 
match the NBBO, the increase is seen in the full sample as well as the most and the least constrained 
subsamples (Panel A). For orders that match or improve the NBBO, the coefficients are 
insignificant for the most constrained ETFs. This result is not surprising given that improving the 
NBBO in such ETFs is often impossible given the constraints of the tick size. 
 
3.4.5. Information asymmetry in the futures market 
Do speed differentials also affect the picking-off risk in futures contracts? On the one hand, 
fast traders may carry information both from futures to equities and in the opposite direction. On the 
other hand, prior research suggests that futures provide the lion’s share of price discovery in index 
instruments. If so, using limited microwave bandwidth to transmit information from ETFs to futures 
may be wasteful. If this is the case, speed differentials may not have much of an effect on the CME. 
To examine this issue, we use the 2012 CME data described in Section 3.4 and compute 
information shares as in Hasbrouck (1995) for the four futures-ETF pairs. The details of the 
methodology are in the Appendix. The results are consistent with earlier studies, in that price 
discovery occurs mainly on the CME; the CME information shares are in the [0.64; 0.82] range. 
Second, in Panel A of Table 3.6 we examine the price impacts in futures during precipitation 
episodes and find no relation. 
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 Statistical power is a concern in the analysis above given the small size of the cross-section. 
To address this concern, in Panel B we replicate the results for the sample of four corresponding 
ETFs. Similarly to the main sample, precipitation is associated with reductions in price impacts. 
 
3.4.6. Democratization of MWN access 
In late December 2012 – early January 2013, a microwave technology provider McKay 
Brothers, disrupted the business model used by the microwave firms. Instead of selling bandwidth 
on its network to select traders, McKay Brothers began selling information transmitted by the 
network to everyone who was willing to pay a nominal fee. Subscribers to this service obtained 
access to an affordable and non-exclusive channel of information transmission that was among the 
fastest in the industry. The offer was soon replicated by other providers, and the market for 
microwave transmissions was democratized. Put differently, microwave users lost the speed 
advantage they enjoyed in 2011-2012. 
Democratization of access to microwave transmission speeds may lead to two outcomes. 
First, the relation between precipitation and market quality observed in 2011-2012 may diminish 
because access to superior speeds is no longer limited to a small group of traders. Second, 
democratization may result in market quality changes similar to those observed during precipitation 
events. In this sense, precipitation episodes in 2011-2012 may be viewed as periods of short-term 
democratization, whereas the 2012-2013 event may be viewed as long-term democratization. 
In Table 3.7, we report the coefficients of the         variable obtained from estimating 
eq. 1 during the post-democratization period. The results confirm expectations. Precipitation 
episodes no longer have an effect on price impacts, effective spreads, realized spreads, volatility and 
trading activity. The change is observed for the full sample and for the most and least constrained 
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subsamples. As such, democratization appears to be a significant market disruptor. 
Given the significance of democratization, the liquidity effects associated with the loss of the 
speed advantage may reappear around the event. To examine if this is the case, we estimate an event 
study regression model that compares market quality and activity variables in a three-month pre-
event window (September – November 2012) and a three-month post-event window (February – 
April 2013). We exclude December 2012 and January 2013 to allow for a transition period, however 
the results are similar when these months are included. The regression is set up as follows: 
                                                                                
where          is one of the following variables (price impacts, effective spreads, realized 
spreads, the number of trades, traded volume, volatility and stock price) in asset   on day  ,    
denotes a time trend,      is a dummy variable that equals to one in February-April 2013, and     
is the volatility index. All variables are standardized. The model controls for asset fixed effects, and 
the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions.  
The main variable of interest in eq. 2 is      as it captures the difference between the pre- 
and post-democratization periods. Consistent with expectations, the results for the full sample in 
Table 3.8 indicate that price impacts, effective spreads, realized spreads and volatility decline post-
democratization. We must however note an important caveat. Democratization was a single event 
that affected all assets at the same time. As such, we are unable to eliminate the possibility that the 
results are driven by a confounding event(s) unrelated to democratization. Although we are unaware 
of any such events, the event study results should be interpreted with due caution. 
A notable difference between the event study and the panel findings discussed earlier comes 
from the trade-related variables: the number of trades and volume. Recall that in the full sample 
these variables decline during precipitation events (Table 3.4), likely because latency arbitrage is 
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diminished. In Table 3.8, these variables do not change post-democratization in the full sample, 
corroborating our earlier suggestion that lower trading costs may encourage new trading interest 
over long periods of time. The new interest offsets the loss of arbitrage volume. The results pointing 
to new trading interest are observed even in the sample of the most constrained ETFs where trade 
and volume losses during precipitation-related disruptions are the largest. Although Table 3.8 shows 
a declining number of trades in the most constrained assets, the change in volume is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that new trading interest arises even in these assets. 
The market structure literature often suggests that lower trading costs translate into higher 
stock prices (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Easley, Hendershott and Ramadorai, 2014). If so, 
liquidity improvements caused by democratization may result in price appreciations. Table 3.8 
indicates that such appreciations indeed occur. 
Given the private benefits from exclusive network access that accrued to the select few 
trading firms in 2011-2012, democratization is a curious case of the market fixing itself. It is 
however not immediately clear why McKay Brothers chose to disrupt the status quo. Cespa and 
Foucault (2014) note that it is in a data provider’s best interest to restrict dissemination of pricing 
data only to select traders. Their model shows that if information is accessible to many, it is less 
valuable to the few who may be willing to pay a premium for the exclusive use. It is our 
understanding that McKay Brothers was driven by the following two motives. First, the firm 
believed that even if others were to replicate its offering, there would be enough pricing information 
for everyone to transmit given the large numbers of traded instruments and the low bandwidth of 
microwave links. Second, the firm argued that growing its customer base was more profitable than 
providing restricted access to a small group of clients. As long as the firm maintained its latency 
advantage, it expected to always retain its customers. Many other connectivity providers launched 
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similar offerings in the months after the democratization, possibly driving down the price of the 
service. This said, McKay Brothers continues to offer the service to this day and has expanded it to 
several continents. 
 
3.5. Robustness 
A rich literature examines the effects of weather on the behavior of market participants and 
finds that poor weather is associated with investor pessimism, which is reflected in stock returns 
(Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). The pessimism affects even the sophisticated investors 
(Goetzmann, Kim, Kumar and Wang, 2015). Furthermore, deHaan, Madsen and Piotroski (2015) 
show that pessimistic moods induced by poor weather often delay equilibrium price adjustments. As 
such, the reduction in adverse selection during precipitation episodes may be attributed (at least in 
part) to slower price discovery caused by the poor weather in Chicago and/or New York rather than 
to the microwave disruptions. 
To examine this possibility, we recalculate the         variable to capture periods when 
the networks are disrupted, yet the moods of traders in Chicago and New York are not affected. 
Specifically, we compute         that satisfies the following two conditions: (i) only weather 
stations in Ohio indicate high levels of precipitation, and (ii) weather stations in the western and 
eastern parts of the Chicago-New York corridor indicate near-zero precipitation. We then re-
estimate eq. 1 for the 2011-2012 sample and report the results in the mood control specification in 
Panel A of Table 3.9. The effects are consistent with those reported in the earlier tables. As such, 
trader moods do not seem to be the source of our findings. 
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Our sample of weather stations is selected to capture the area closely surrounding the 
microwave paths. As with any such selection procedure, it is important to show that the results are 
not driven by the specific set of stations. The mood control specification takes the first step in this 
direction by restricting the sample to the Ohio stations. In two additional Table 3.9 specifications, 
we show that using information from an expanded area surrounding the MWN paths leads to similar 
conclusions, while precipitation in the placebo area over Colorado, Utah and Wyoming (far 
removed from the Chicago-New York corridor) has no effect on the variables of interest. 
Information asymmetry, trading costs and trading activity vary throughout the day. For 
instance, effective spreads follow an intraday J-pattern, with wider spreads in the morning that 
become narrower in the afternoon (Figure 3.6). Notably, intraday precipitation too follows a reverse 
J-pattern, with precipitation amounts being lower in the morning hours. Since the results in the 
previous section point to a negative relation between precipitation and spreads, we need to establish 
that the findings are not due to these intraday patterns. 
We examine this possibility in two additional specifications in Panel A of Table 3.9. First, 
we focus on the afternoon period, when spreads and precipitation are relatively flat. Our results hold 
for every variable of interest. Second, the results continue to hold when we add intraday fixed 
effects to eq. 1. As such, the relations between precipitation and spreads observed in the earlier 
sections are independent of intraday patterns.  
Recall that the        variable estimates total precipitation in the Chicago-New York 
corridor. This variable is well-suited to capture periods of high precipitation over small areas, but 
may occasionally acquire high values if relatively minor precipitation extends over the entire 
corridor. This possibility is the reason for our focus on         that captures very high 
precipitation totals not likely to be achieved through anything other than significant precipitation. 
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To provide another alternative to       , in Panel B of Table 3.9 we report the results using the 
average precipitation per station,        , and its variations,          and         , that 
capture periods when average precipitation is 0.5 and 1 standard deviations above the mean. We 
note that although these variables mitigate the abovementioned concern, they potentially reduce our 
ability to detect relatively narrow bands of strong precipitation, especially those accompanied by 
near-zero precipitation in the rest of the corridor (Figure 3.3). Corroborating this reasoning, the 
results for         are weaker than those reported earlier for       , yet the results for 
         and          are equally as strong as those for their counterparts computed using 
total precipitation. 
In the main analysis, we compute the effective spreads and their components on a volume-
weighted basis. As such, large trades have a stronger effect on the estimates than small trades. To 
shed more light on the effects of network disruptions on small trades, in Table 3.10 we report eq. 1 
regression results for the equally-weighted variables (specifications    ). The results reported 
earlier hold.  
The results for the volume-weighted effective spreads and their components reported in 
earlier tables use raw dollar metrics. Naturally, raw spreads may vary in the price of the asset. 
Although our regressions account for the overall price levels by using asset fixed effects, intraday 
price changes remain unaccounted for. The      specifications in Table 3.10 address this issue 
using effective spreads, price impacts and realized spreads scaled by the midquote at the time of 
trade. The results corroborate those reported in the earlier tables. 
In the previous sections, we discuss the effects of network disruptions on effective spreads. 
We also show that the effects differ between the assets most and least constrained by the minimum 
tick size. In Table 3.11, we estimate eq. 1 for two additional variables – the quoted NBBO spread 
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and quoted depth. Whereas effective spreads capture the realized trading costs, the quoted spreads 
summarize liquidity that is available at all times. As long as investors choose to trade when costs are 
low, effective spreads may not be fully indicative of changes in available liquidity. Table 3.11 
shows that quoted spreads decline when the networks are down across all sample groups. The 
coefficients repeat the patterns reported for effective spreads, with quoted spreads declining more 
for the least constrained ETFs, in which more price improvement is possible. 
Table 3.11 also reports the results for quoted NBBO depth, which increases during network 
disruptions, but only for the most constrained ETFs. This finding is consistent with the earlier 
discussion. In the most constrained ETFs, there is not always room to improve the spread, so 
liquidity improvements are reflected in quoted depth. There is certainly an alternative mechanical 
explanation in that less depth is consumed by arbitrage strategies during precipitation episodes, 
therefore allowing for larger depth averages. Notably, depth does not increase in the least 
constrained ETFs. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 This study examines the effects of speed differentials on liquidity. During our sample period, 
microwave networks located between Chicago and New York allow for the fastest information 
transmission and are only available to select trading firms. When it rains or snows in the area 
between the two cities, the networks are disrupted because rain droplets and snowflakes block the 
microwave paths. With the networks temporarily down, information transmission falls back onto the 
fiber-optic cable – a more reliable, yet slower transmission medium – effectively eliminating the 
speed advantages of the fastest traders. We show that when this happens, adverse selection and 
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trading costs decline. This result is consistent with predictions of theory models that show that speed 
differentials among traders may be associated with lower liquidity. 
 Our results also shed new light on traders’ order choices. Recent research suggests that 
informed fast traders may prefer to trade via limit orders. Our results confirm that this is the case, 
yet this preference varies in the cross-section. Specifically, in assets with binding tick sizes, trading 
on short-lived information through limit orders is difficult due to long queues. In such assets, traders 
prefer marketable orders.  
 Our results are confirmed in an event-study setting. In winter of 2012-2013, a technology 
firm, McKay Brothers, democratized microwave transmissions by introducing a new business 
model. Instead of selling bandwidth on its network, the firm began selling information on both sides 
of the Chicago-New York corridor. This event had positive liquidity consequences similar to 
precipitation-related network disruptions. 
The technological race continues to drive spending in the trading industry. Recent examples 
include new data transmission towers to connect the U.K. and European markets. The towers will be 
among the tallest structures in the U.K. and will rival the Eiffel Tower. They will provide trading 
firms with a completely unobstructed optical and radio line of sight, never previously offered in 
Europe, increasing signal transmission speed. In the meantime, traders in the U.S. have been 
switching from microwave transmissions to more reliable, yet costly, laser links. Our findings shed 
light on the possible consequences of these developments.  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics for precipitation and for the sample of 100 ETFs. In Panel 
A,        is the variable that captures total precipitation recorded by the weather stations along 
the Chicago-New York corridor. Along with precipitation statistics (in mm per a 15-minute 
sampling interval), we report the percent share of intervals with        greater than 0.5 
standard deviations (       ) and with        greater than 1 standard deviation (       ). 
Finally, we report the length of an average period with consecutive         and         as 
well as the percent share of days with episodes of         or        . Panel B classifies 100 
sample ETFs into categories according to the underlying asset basket. 
Panel A: Precipitation   
      , mm/interval  
mean 0.155 
median 0.070 
std. dev. 0.218 
% intervals with         17.0 
% intervals with         10.5 
length        , min 54.2 
length        , min 49.1 
  
Panel B: ETF sample  
Equities 
 US index 50 
International index 22 
Interest rate products 20 
Metals 4 
Real estate 1 
Other 3 
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Table 3.2. Market activity statistics 
The table contains summary statistics for the sample of 100 ETFs. Statistics are derived from the 
millisecond DTAQ data and aggregated into 15-minute intervals to match precipitation data. 
Volatility is defined as the difference between the high and low price in a 15-minute interval 
scaled by the average price. Trade price discovery is the percentage of efficient price variance 
that may be attributed to trades (Hasbrouck, 1991). The National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) is 
defined as the difference between the lowest offer quote and the highest bid quote across all 
markets. We divide the assets into terciles by their average NBBO. Assets with the smallest 
(largest) NBBOs are considered the most (least) tick-constrained. Price impact is defined as 
twice the signed difference between the NBBO midquote 15 seconds after the trade and the 
midquote at the time of the trade. Effective spread is twice the signed difference between the 
trade price and the corresponding midquote. Realized spread is the difference between the 
effective spread and the corresponding price impact. 
  mean std. dev. 25% median 75% 
Panel A: Activity statistics 
# NBBO 
updates 5,305 8,169 608 2,470 6,953 
# trades 500 1,233 39 113 432 
volume, sh. 190,522 485,076 13,438 32,171 120,444 
price, $ 71.69 36.67 42.08 69.61 92.06 
trade size, sh. 448 852 246 311 425 
volatility, % 0.154 0.076 0.111 0.158 0.195 
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Panel B: Trading cost statistics 
NBBO, $ 0.019 0.024 0.010 0.012 0.019 
most constrained 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.010 
least constrained 0.036 0.037 0.018 0.028 0.042 
      
trade price disc., % 0.296 0.159 0.194 0.261 0.350 
price impact, $ 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.009 
effective spread, $ 0.019 0.032 0.010 0.011 0.018 
realized spread, $ 0.013 0.033 0.002 0.007 0.014 
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Table 3.3. Microwave connectivity and trading costs 
The table contains coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                  
where          is one of the following variables: the price impact,     , the effective spread,    , or the realized spread,    , in 
asset  ;        is total precipitation in the Chicago-New York corridor; and     is the volatility index. We also use         and 
        to identify the most significant precipitation events. All variables are standardized (by demeaning and scaling by the 
standard deviation for each stock) and as such the regression models control for asset fixed effects, and the standard errors (in 
parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. The data are from the 2011-2012 period. Panel A examines the 
full sample of 100 ETFs, and Panel B examines the assets for which the minimum tick size is the most (least) binding. For this test, we 
separate the assets into terciles by their average NBBO on the previous day. Assets with the smallest (largest) NBBOs are considered 
the most (least) tick-constrained. Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
               
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Full sample 
       -.010***    -.010***    -.005**   
 
(.004)    (.003)    (.002)   
         -.035***    -.041***    -.024***  
 
 (.012)    (.010)    (.007)  
          -.047***    -.043***    -.021*** 
 
  (.013)    (.011)    (.008) 
    .035*** .035*** .035***  .057*** .058*** .057***  .036*** .036*** .036*** 
 
(.009) (.009) (.009)  (.008) (.008) (.008)  (.006) (.006) (.006) 
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Panel B: Effects of         for assets that are the most (least) constrained by the minimum tick size (large sample) 
                
 most  least  most  least  most  least 
        -.051***  -.039***  -.023***  -.079***  -.006  -.058*** 
 
(.017)  (.010)  (.008)  (.020)  (.007)  (.017) 
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Table 3.4. Microwave connectivity, trading activity and volatility 
The table contains coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                  
where          is one of the following three variables (the number of trades, traded volume, or volatility) in asset   during a 15-
minute interval  ;        is total precipitation in the Chicago-New York corridor; and     is the volatility index. We also use 
        and         to identify the most significant precipitation events. All variables are standardized and as such the regression 
models control for asset fixed effects, and the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time 
dimensions. The data are from the 2011-2012 period. Panel A examines the full sample of 100 ETFs, Panel B examines the assets for 
which the minimum tick size is the least (most) binding. For this test, we separate the assets into terciles by their average NBBO on 
the previous day. Assets with the smallest (largest) NBBOs are considered the most (least) tick-constrained. Asterisks ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
trades  volume  volatility 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Full sample 
       -.010***    -.012***    -.025**   
 
(.006)    (.004)    (.010)   
         -.070***    -.044***    -.103***  
 
 (.020)    (.013)    (.032)  
          -.072***    -.042***    -.118*** 
 
  (.023)    (.015)    (.036) 
    .079*** .079*** .079***  .049*** .050*** .049***  .185*** .186*** .185*** 
 
(.015) (.015) (.015)  (.009) (.009) (.009)  (.024) (.024) (.024) 
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Panel B: Effects of         for assets that are the most (least) constrained by the minimum tick size (large sample) 
 trades  volume  volatility 
 most  least  most  least  most  least 
        -.111***  -.015  -.064***  -.010  -.119***  -.109*** 
 
(.034)  (.021)  (.025)  (.013)  (.038)  (.032) 
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Table 3.5. Limit order aggressiveness: ITCH sample 
The table contains coefficient estimates    from the following panel regression estimated using 
ITCH limit order book data: 
                                  
where          is one of the following two variables: (i) the number of limit orders that match 
the NBBO in ETF   during period   (Panel A), and (ii) the number of orders that match or 
improve the NBBO (Panel B). Both variables are scaled by the number of order submissions. 
       is total precipitation in the Chicago-New York corridor; and     is the volatility index. 
We also use         and         to identify the most significant precipitation events. All 
variables are standardized and as such the regression models control for asset fixed effects, and 
the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Note: 
results reported here are derived from 2012; we are in the process of adding the results from 
2011. 
 
Panel A: NBBO match  Panel B: NBBO match or improve 
full sample most constr. least constr.  full sample most constr. least constr. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
       .017*** .025*** .038***  .006 .008 .041*** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.006)  (.004) (.005) (.006) 
       .054*** .080*** .095***  .028*** .006 .107*** 
 
(.007) (.008) (.011)  (.006) (.010) (.010) 
       .040*** .068*** .113***  .063*** .010 .126*** 
 
(.012) (.013) (.013)  (.012) (.015) (.013) 
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Table 3.6. Microwave connectivity and information asymmetries in futures and equities: 
small sample 
The table contains coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                
where        is the price impact;        is total precipitation in the Chicago-New York 
corridor; and     is the volatility index. We also use         and         to identify the 
most significant precipitation events. All variables are standardized, and as such the regression 
models control for asset fixed effects, and the standard errors (in parentheses) are time-clustered. 
The futures sample (Panel A) is from 2012 and includes four e-mini contracts: S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap 400, Nasdaq 100 and Financial Sector Select. The equities sample (Panel B) is from the 
same time period and includes the four corresponding ETFs. Asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: futures  Panel B: equities 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
       -.004    -.037***   
 
(.009)    (.006)   
        -.003    -.078***  
 
 (.022)    (.018)  
         -.014    -.079*** 
 
  (.031)    (.022) 
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Table 3.7. Post-democratization period 
The table reports the    coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                   
where          is one of the following four variables (price impacts, effective spreads, 
realized spreads, number of trades, traded volume, or volatility) in asset   during a 15-minute 
interval  ;         is a dummy variable that captures periods when total precipitation in the 
Chicago-New York corridor exceeds one standard deviation; and     is the volatility index. All 
variables are standardized and as such the regression models control for asset fixed effects, and 
the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. 
The data are from the 2013-2014 period. We examine three groups of assets: (i) 100 ETFs in the 
full sample, and (ii/iii) the ETF terciles for which the tick size is the most (least) binding. 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
              trades volume volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
full sample .007 .001 -.003 .027 .007 .016 
 (.013) (.012) (.009) (.018) (.012) (.033) 
most constr. -.016 .003 .010 .024 .009 .001 
 (.015) (.008) (.007) (.023) (.018) (.031) 
least constr. .014 .002 -.006 .031 .005 .023 
 (.012) (.021) (.016) (.021) (.009) (.032) 
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Table 3.8. Democratization: Event study 
The event window spans the months of September 2012 to April 2013. In this window, the 
months of September, October and November capture the period prior to the democratization, 
and the months of February, March and April capture the post-democratization period. We report 
the coefficient estimates    from the following panel regression: 
                                   
where          is one of the following variables (price impacts, effective spreads, realized 
spreads, number of trades, traded volume, volatility or stock price) in asset   on day  ;    denotes 
a time trend,      is a dummy variable that equals to one in February-April 2013; and     is 
the volatility index. All variables are standardized and as such the regression models control for 
asset fixed effects, and the standard errors are double-clustered along the asset and time 
dimensions. We examine three groups of assets: (i) 100 ETFs in the full sample, and (ii/iii) the 
ETF terciles for which the tick size is the most (least) binding. Asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
              trades volume volatility price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
full sample -.484*** -.711*** -.546*** -.071 .045 -.836*** .319*** 
 (.122) (.127) (.125) (.129) (.125) (.244) (.083) 
most constr. -.590*** -.454** -.190 -.475*** -.174 -1.09*** .496*** 
 (.185) (.179) (.184) (.171) (.177) (.254) (.135) 
least constr. -.448*** -.965*** -.905*** .084 .095 -.542** .284** 
 (.100) (.181) (.178) (.120) (.123) (.222) (.129) 
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Table 3.9. Robustness: alternative sampling and regression setup 
The table reports the    coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                   
where          is one of the following variables (price impacts, effective spreads, realized 
spreads, number of trades, traded volume, or volatility) in asset   during a 15-minute interval  ; 
        is a dummy variable that captures periods when total precipitation in the Chicago-New 
York corridor exceeds one standard deviation (Panel A); and     is the volatility index. We 
examine several specifications of the model. The mood control specification restricts 
precipitation episodes to those occurring in Ohio when precipitation is near-zero in the eastern 
and western parts of the Chicago-New York corridor. The expanded area specification uses 
additional weather stations, forming a wider area around the corridor. The placebo area 
specification uses data from the weather stations located in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, away 
from the corridor. The afternoon only specification uses data between noon and the market close. 
The intraday FE specification adds intraday fixed effects. Finally, Panel B replaces total 
precipitation across all stations with the average precipitation per station        , and its two 
variations,          and         , which are dummies that capture episodes when the 
average precipitation is more than 0.5 and 1 standard deviation removed from the mean. All 
variables are standardized and as such the regression models control for asset fixed effects, and 
the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. 
The data are from the 2011-2012 period, and we examine the full sample of 100 ETFs. Asterisks 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
              trades volume volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:         =         
mood control -.060*** -.061*** -.026*** -.094*** -.053*** -.166*** 
 (.013) (.012) (.009) (.024) (.016) (.035) 
expanded area -.034*** -.040*** -.020** -.055** -.032** -.087** 
 (.013) (.012) (.008) (.023) (.015) (.039) 
placebo area .006 -.012 -.001 .015 .003 -.036 
 (.016) (.025) (.019) (.024) (.016) (.038) 
afternoon only -.061*** -.063*** -.028*** -.080*** -.048*** -.147*** 
 (.015) (.014) (.010) (.026) (.018) (.040) 
intraday FE -.054*** -.060*** -.028*** -.067*** -.043*** -.141*** 
 (.012) (.012) (.008) (.021) (.014) (.035) 
       
Panel B:                                      
        -.007* -.006* -.003 -.014** -.009** -.013 
 (.004) (.004) (.002) (.006) (.004) (.011) 
         -.024** -.027** -.013* -.051*** -.030** -.057* 
 (.012) (.011) (.007) (.020) (.013) (.034) 
         -.043*** -.039*** -.014* -.067*** -.037*** -.096*** 
 (.012) (.011) (.008) (.021) (.014) (.035) 
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Table 3.10. Robustness: alternative variables of interest 
The table reports the    coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                   
where          is one of the following three variables: price impacts (     ), effective 
spreads (   ) and realized spreads (   ). Each variable is computed as equally-weighted 
(   ) or volume-weighted scaled by the corresponding midquote (    );         is a 
dummy variable that captures periods when total precipitation in the Chicago-New York corridor 
exceeds one standard deviation; and     is the volatility index. All variables are standardized 
and as such the regression models control for asset fixed effects, and the standard errors (in 
parentheses) are double-clustered along the asset and time dimensions. The data are from the 
2011-2012 period. We examine three groups of assets: (i) 100 ETFs in the full sample, and (ii/iii) 
the ETF terciles for which the tick size is the most (least) binding. Asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
                         VW                     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
full sample -.064*** -.059*** -.089*** -.067*** -.008 -.032*** 
 (.018) (.014) (.021) (.015) (.012) (.010) 
most constr. -.079*** -.069*** -.086*** -.035*** .030* -.005 
 (.026) (.020) (.020) (.010) (.018) (.008) 
least constr. -.046*** -.047*** -.105*** -.109*** -.067*** -.077*** 
 (.014) (.011) (.030) (.027) (.026) (.022) 
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Table 3.11. Quoted spread and inside depth 
The table reports the    coefficient estimates from the following panel regression: 
                                   
where          is one of the following four variables (NBBO spread or NBBO inside depth) 
in asset   during a 15-minute interval  ;         is a dummy variable that captures periods 
when total precipitation in the Chicago-New York corridor exceeds one standard deviation; and 
    is the volatility index. All variables are standardized and as such the regression models 
control for asset fixed effects, and the standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered along 
the asset and time dimensions. The data are from the 2011-2012 period. We examine three 
groups of assets: (i) 100 ETFs in the full sample, and (ii/iii) the ETF terciles for which the tick 
size is the most (least) binding. Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
           
 (1) (2) 
full sample -.065*** .014 
 (.020) (.029) 
most constr. -.026** .118*** 
 (.012) (.045) 
least constr. -.105*** -.013 
 (.034) (.034) 
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Figure 3.1. Microwave network paths 
The figure maps tower locations of three microwave networks (blue, yellow and purple icons) 
obtained from the Federal Communications Commission. There are more than three 
microwave networks between Chicago and New York during our sample period; however, 
we plot only three to avoid clutter. The remaining networks follow very similar paths. The 
red markers indicate locations of the CME’s data center in Aurora, IL (marker A); the NYSE 
data center in Mahwah, NJ (marker M); Nasdaq data center in Carteret, NJ (marker C); 
BATS data center in Weehawken, NJ (marker W); and Direct Edge data center in Secaucus, 
NJ (marker S). 
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Figure 3.2. Locations of microwave networks and weather stations 
The figure maps the weather stations (green icons) located near the microwave network 
paths. Station data are obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
The red markers indicate locations of the CME’s data center in Aurora, IL (marker A); the 
NYSE data center in Mahwah, NJ (marker M); Nasdaq data center in Carteret, NJ (marker 
C); BATS data center in Weehawken, NJ (marker W); and Direct Edge data center in 
Secaucus, NJ (marker S). 
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Figure 3.3. A typical weather front 
As a weather front moves over the microwave paths, it disrupts data transmission forcing 
trading firms to fall back on the fiber-optic cable. 
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Figure 3.4. Equity trades after a futures trade during low and heavy precipitation 
episodes 
The figure reports a timeline of equity trades that follow a futures trade. Orange bars 
represent periods of zero or very low precipitation (       <0), and blue bars represent 
periods of heavy precipitation (       >1) when the microwave networks are disrupted. 
The number of trades is standardized on an asset by asset basis to allow for cross-sectional 
comparability. We focus on the standalone futures trades (  = 0), those not preceded by 
another futures or equity trade in the previous 100 milliseconds. Note: light covers the 
distance from Chicago to New York in 4 milliseconds (ms), the microwave signal covers this 
distance in about 4.5 ms, and the same signal takes 6.5 ms to cover the distance through fiber. 
During our sample period, the CME clock lags DTAQ by about one millisecond, and we 
adjust for this lag. The 2-ms advantage of the fastest traders is evident even without the 
adjustment. 
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Figure 3.5. Price impacts 
The figure reports price impacts computed as the signed difference between a midquote at a 
certain time after the trade and the midquote at the time of the trade:        
   (           ), where    is the trade direction indicator,      is the midquote 
computed as                       ⁄ , and   indicates the time elapsed since the 
trade, with                      . 
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Figure 3.6. Intraday patterns 
The figure reports intraday patterns for        (in mm average per intraday period, left 
axis),         and         (both in number of occasions per intraday period, right axis), 
and     (scaled by 10000 for display purposes, right axis). 
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Appendix to Every cloud has a silver lining: Fast trading, microwave 
connectivity and trading costs 
A1. Price discovery via trades and quotes 
To examine price discovery via trades and quotes, we use the methodology described in 
Hasbrouck (1991 a,b) to decompose the efficient price variance into the trade-related and trade-
unrelated components. We begin with an assumption that the observed midquotes    follow a random 
walk with two components: 
        , 
where    is the efficient price (the expectation of price conditioned on all available information at 
time  ), and    is a deviation of the price from the efficient price. We then estimate the VAR with ten 
lags as follows: 
                                                
                                         , 
where    is the difference in log-midquotes, and    is a vector of three trade-related variables, 
including a trade direction indicator, signed volume and signed square root of volume. The VAR is 
then converted into the VMA model: 
     
          
            
        
          
          
     
          
            
          
          , 
and the total variance of the random walk component is given by: 
  
     ∑   
  
    
   
   ∑   
  
      ∑   
       , 
where the first term corresponds to the trade-unrelated component of the efficient price innovation, 
and the second term corresponds to the trade-related component of this innovation. The model is 
estimated in event time, with  s indexing every new midquote. 
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A2. Information share estimation 
To compute information shares using the methodology in Hasbrouck (1995), we first estimate 
the following vector error correction model (VECM) for each futures-ETF pair: 
                                                    (               )      
                                                    (               )       
 
where       (     ) is the difference between the current and lagged prices of the futures (ETF), and   
is the mean difference between the price of the futures and the ETF. 
In the second step, we obtain the VMA representation of the above model: 
                                         
                                         
 
and add the coefficients   ∑   
 
  and  ∑    
 
  Next we obtain the covariance matrix of the 
residuals: 
  [
  
    
     
 ], 
and finally, the information share (IS) of the futures market is calculated as:  
    
    
 
  
 , where   
  [
 
 
]
 
[
  
    
     
 ] [
 
 
]. 
Since some price innovations happen in both markets within the same millisecond,      . To 
address this, we follow Hasbrouck (1995) and orthogonalize  . Orthogonalization maximises 
(minimises) the variance of the futures market and gives the upper (lower) bound of the true variance. 
 
